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Abstract
Systems that provide Digital Rights Management (DRM) are highly complex and exten-
sive: DRM technologies must support a diversity of devices, users, platforms, and media, and
a wide variety of system requirements concerning security, exibility, and manageability. This
complexity and extensiveness poses major challenges to DRM development due to fragmen-
tation of individual solutions, limited reuse and interoperability between DRM systems, and
lack of a domain-specic structure that supports and guides the design and implementation
of DRM systems and their applications. In order to handle these challenges in an eective
and ecient way, we need to understand the DRM context and the internal structure of cur-
rent DRM solutions. This report presents (1) an easy to understand introduction to DRM
by proposing a high level architectural view, (2) an overview of the most important DRM
technologies, both proprietary point solutions and open standards, and their mapping onto
the architectural view, (3) an overview of the most important rights expression languages,
and (4) a discussion on the evolution of DRM that can be expected in the near future. Identi-
fying key DRM services and rights enforcement technologies, and locating them in an overall
architecture brings us one step closer to a software architecture for DRM.
1 Introduction
The domain of digital rights management (DRM) is currently lacking a generic architecture that
supports interoperability and reuse of specic DRM technologies. This lack of architectural sup-
port is a serious drawback in light of the rapid evolution of a complex domain like DRM. It is
highly unlikely that a single DRM technology or standard will be able to support the diversity
of devices, users, platforms, and media, or the wide variety of system requirements concerning
security, exibility, and eciency.
This report is based on [69] and adds to it a study on DRM standards and Rights Expression
Languages (RELs). The rst objective of this report is to provide an easy to understand intro-
duction to the global working principles of state-of-the-art DRM systems. We want to present a
high-level architectural view on DRM that highlights the main building blocks a DRM system is
composed of. Secondly, we want to oer the reader an overview of the most important technologies
currently available and map the generic DRM architecture onto each particular technology. On the
one hand, we enumerate the most relevant point solutions for DRM that we are currently aware
of; these solutions are typically proprietary, although some of them integrate open standards into
their solution. On the other hand, we oer an overview of the most important DRM standards and
RELs. The third objective is to make clear how far DRM is developed today and what evolution
we can expect in the near future.
The report analyses state-of-the-art DRM technologies and extracts from them high level usage
scenarios according to content consumers, producers, and publishers. In addition, the key services
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are identied both from a functional and security perspective. Identifying key DRM services and
locating them in an overall structure brings us one step closer to a software architecture for DRM.
Having available a software architecture should help the DRM community in reasoning about
DRM systems, and in achieving reuse and interoperability between multiple domain-specic DRM
technologies and standards.
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. This introduction sketches the context
of DRM by dening key terminology and introducing the basic concepts. It also summarizes the
main requirements from three perspectives: security, exibility, and eciency. Section 2 presents
a generic DRM architecture from three application viewpoints: the content consumer, the content
producer, and the content publisher. This architecture allows for high-level reasoning about DRM
solutions, independent from a specic implementation. Section 3 presents an overview of state-
of-the-art DRM technologies and maps each of them onto the generic architecture presented in
Section 2. Section 4 presents open DRM standards and rights expression languages. Section 5
concludes by summarizing the highlights in this report.
1.1 An evolving technology with evolving requirements
For a long time, people who wanted to hear a song had to listen to the radio or needed a physical
medium such as a gramophone record. Only when having the original medium, one was able to
consume it (i.e. listen to a song, read a book, view a video or image). In the eighties, copying
became not only possible but also aordable. Yet, copying data always implied a signicant
decrease in quality. The quality of a movie recorded from television on VHS tape, for instance,
is clearly distinguishable from the original transmission. Further copying the VHS tape leads to
further degradation of video quality.
During the last decade, one could notice an enormous increase in capabilities of both data
copying and data storage. A copy can now retain almost perfectly the original quality, and it can be
stored easily. Moreover, copying and storage technologies have become aordable. The popularity
of the Internet and its increasing bandwidth and transfer speeds has enabled the distribution of
popular (multimedia) content around the globe, just by performing a few mouse clicks.
The ease of copying and sharing digital content without a signicant decrease in quality has
resulted in a huge amount of piracy. Obviously, content owners and distributors are searching for
ways to stop illegal data copying and distribution. Clearly, some law suits to deter most people
did not really work. A more eective way to tackle the problem is to use technology to make it
impossible, or at least very hard, to ignore or circumvent copyright rules. This is where Digital
Rights Management (DRM) comes into play. At present, existing DRM technologies are not yet
perfect, but they already have become useful in practice.
1.2 Denition of DRM
DRM is a technological way to allow owners of digital content to control access to this content
and to restrict its usage in various ways that can be specied by the owner or his delegates.
Under digital content we understand audio, video, images, text, other data constructs and any
combinations of these in a digitally represented format. Obviously, computer programs are also
considered to be digital content.
DRM can thus be dened1 as the management and enforcement of usage rules, including
copyright rules, on digital content. Optionally, it can also be responsible for all the accounting
aspects.
The purpose of DRM can further be summarized as follows:
 DRM allows content to be associated with access rights and copyrights. DRM enables the
owner of digital content to associate the notion of access rights to that content, and to enable
1We are aware of the existence of other DRM denitions [65], but we use the one that is most common and
accepted in the research community.
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consumers of the content to acquire the necessary rights that enable them to use the content
for their needs.
 It can enforce that the copyright on digital content is respected. Copying may only be possible
for people who have the necessary rights. This can be based on their role and identity in an
organization; or it can be based on the fact that they have paid (or have committed to pay)
for the proper copyright. The copyright on digital content isn't respected if the technology
is based on the fair-use principle.
 It allows content owners to add extra (more sophisticated) usage rules. The usage of DRM
opens a whole set of new possibilities, much more than just enforcing the copyright. DRM
enables, for example, to restrict the consumption of digital content to a predened time-
space, to limit the number of times digital content can be consumed, or to specify the
allowed actions (e.g. view, but not print).
 It supports management of accounting aspects. The fee that consumers usually pay for con-
suming content has to be managed and distributed among various parties. The content owner
may want a compensation in proportion to the eective usage of his content. In addition,
the content publisher should get a compensation for making content available. Finally, the
network provider may have a nancial agreement based on the amount of download trac
associated with specic content. The DRM system must support accounting and nancial
aspects, or at least enable to cooperate with external accounting or payment systems.
DRM will only become an acceptable technology if it takes into account technological, as well
as economical, social and legal concerns [50]. From a technological perspective, functional features
must be oered in a user-friendly way. Economically, consumers want to obtain digital content in
various formats via new content delivery services. This must result in new business models. It is
a social challenge to convince consumers that DRM is an appropriate mechanism to enjoy content
and, by consequence, provides added-value. And nally, from a legal point of view, the evolution
of DRM must involve eorts towards international harmonisation and protection of intellectual
property.
1.3 Objectives
The rst objective of this report is to provide an easy to understand introduction to the global
working principles of state-of-the-art DRM systems. We want to present a high-level architectural
view on DRM that highlights the main building blocks a DRM system is composed of. Secondly, we
want to oer the reader an overview of the most important technologies currently available and map
the generic DRM architecture onto each particular technology. On the one hand we enumerate
the most relevant point solutions for DRM that we are currently aware of; these solutions are
typically proprietary, although some of them integrate open standards into their solution. The
third objective is to make clear how far DRM is developed today and what evolution we can expect
in the near future.
1.4 Basic concepts
In order to discuss the high level concepts of state-of-the-art DRM systems in further detail, we
briey sketch the DRM context by introducing the key terminology rst. After that, we elaborate
on the basic concepts by discussing (1) how content is protected, (2) how rights are expressed, (3)
how rights are associated to protected content, (4) how dierent sets of rights can be specied,
(5) how content and rights are distributed and, nally (5) how content can be used.
1.4.1 Context
Content refers to the data to protect. This can be audio, video, images, formatted or unformatted
text, software or other data constructs. Dierent actions on content are possible (e.g. play, print,
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Figure 1: The typical roles involved in DRM are the producer, the consumer and the publisher
role. The consumer uses the Consumer Tool to obtain content. The publisher uses the Publisher
Tool to publish the content created by the producer.
or save), each of which may be content type dependent. For example, what could we mean by
printing a song? Performing an action on content is called content consumption.
The main roles (see gure 1) involved in DRM are the producer, the consumer and the publisher
role. Each role represents one or more persons, services, or companies that play a coherent role
in the DRM processing chain. The producer is the entity that produces content, or at least owns
the rights to distribute and sell it, and represents the starting point of the DRM chain. This can
be, for instance, an author, a musician, a director, or a record label (such as EMI, Sony and AOL
Time Warner). At the other end of the DRM chain, the consumer is the entity who wants to
obtain and consume content. For example, a home user that wants to download and play music.
The publisher is the entity that owns and manages the DRM system used to distribute content,
and forms the bridge between consumers and producers. Most DRM technologies available today
focus on the consumer aspect.
The onlineDRM system is the set of DRM related services oered by the publisher to consumers
and producers. The DRM client is the entity at consumer side that is responsible for performing
the DRM-specic operations in a secure way while obeying the right specications. The producer
tool enables producers to add content and corresponding contracts to the DRM system. In this
way, content becomes publicly available and licenses can be issued. The publisher tool for its part
allows a publisher to manage and maintain the DRM system.
The DRM client is the only entity at the consumer side that is allowed to unprotect the
protected content; it must not expose this content to other hard- or software. Usually, some kind
of encryption is used to protect content. This abuse prevention mechanism is often combined with
a detection mechanism, which allows to identify the source of misuse when illegally distributed
content is found.
To formalize the rights a consumer may obtain on some content, usage rules can be dened
in a Rights Expression Language (REL). A REL denes a language and vocabulary that enable
the specication and interpretation of usage rules in an unambiguous way. For example it can be
used to formally describe that a person Bob can listen to a specic DRM protected song only ve
times in the year 2005. The two most successful RELs are ODRL and MPEG REL [60, 56].
Usage rules must be associated with the corresponding piece of DRM protected content. The
concept of licenses introduces a separation of DRM protected content and the sets of usage rules
to be associated with it. Licenses are typically bound to protected content, but may also be
associated with one or more specic devices or legitimate consumers. In the latter case, only these
specic devices or persons are able to consume the corresponding protected content using that
license. Each distinct set of usage rules can dene another license type. Dierent license types
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may correspond to the same content.
Producers often want to specify the license types themselves, i.e. they want to specify dierent
sets of usage rules describing the rights consumers can obtain. The producer may also want to
associate business information with a license type, such as the price and distribution period. All
this information is negotiated with the publisher and combined in a contract corresponding to
the submitted content. This contract contains all information that is needed by the online DRM
system to issue dierent license types.
1.4.2 Expressing rights
In the past, things were not that complicated. Given the medium on which content resided, one
could view the video or listen to a song. As sketched above, the concept of DRM opens a whole set
of new possibilities, not only in enforcing new rules on how the content can be consumed, but also
in the way a consumer can distribute its rights to consume content on other devices or by other
persons. Here we will discuss the possibilities conceptually, dening rules that can be combined
using rst order logic and that can possibly even easily expressed by the content producer.
Dening these rules is done using a Right Expression Language (REL). A REL denes a
language and vocabulary that enables the specication and interpretation of usage rules in an
unambiguous way. To give an example; it enables to formally describe that a person Bob can
listen to a DRM protected song only 5 times in the year 2005. The two most successful, generally
applicable, exible and extensible RELs are ODRL and MPEG-21 REL. Also, some RELs for
more specic business domains appeared. One such language is PRISM [35], which is directed to
newspaper publishers.
A REL must specify a number of concepts:
 The content to which the rights are related. This may also be a subpart of multi-part
content.
 The parties that obtain the rights: who or what devices may be able to consume the content.
All the people in an oce, for example, may be able to view a document only on devices
set by that company. This makes it impossible to read the document at home or useless to
send it to others.
 The actions that can be allowed by a party on content. We distinguish between consumption
actions and distribution actions. Some of the former are print, play, execute, display, install,
delete, verify, restore, uninstall, save, backup, modify, annotate, and aggregate, while some
of the latter are sell, lend, give, lease, move and duplicate. Actions are often content type
specic
 The conditions that must be fullled before being able to do one or more associated actions
on the content. Conditions can be grouped:
{ Party bounds (what subject). Only devices or users with certain properties may be able
to do certain actions. A device may need for example a valid certicate that identies
it as a secure device, or it may have to meet certain hardware specications.
{ Content bounds (what object). The associated action is only possible on a part of the
content. The content can for example only be consumed if it has a certain quality or
format or if it has other properties.
{ Repeating bounds (how long, how many). The associated action can only be done a
limited number of times (e.g. 10 times) or the accumulated time of the action can be
limited (e.g. you can listen to the song max. 60 minutes altogether).
{ Geographical bounds (where). It is possible to specify where content can be consumed,
for example, only in Belgium.
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{ Temporal bounds (when). It is possible to specify when content can be consumed. This
can be a period (e.g. 2 months) that starts either at a predened time (e.g. 1 January
2006) or at the time the associated action is performed for the rst time. When the
period is set to unlimited and the start date is xed, content can become accessible
starting from that date. Another option is to dene intervals within limited time zones
such as a day, a week, a month or a year. For example, usage rules can dene that
a movie can only be viewed between 8.00 p.m. and 11.00 p.m. each Saturday and
Sunday.
Using these concepts, usage rules can be composed, which dene rights on the content for
the consumer. We distinguish between consumption rules and distribution rules. The former are
related to consumption actions, while the latter to distribution actions.
Because the extended number of dierent usage and types of content, that are often business
or content specic, it is impossible to give a full coverage of all conditions, actions, parties and
content. General RELs such as ODRL (see Section 4.3) and MPEG-21 REL (see Section 4.1) give
a good basis that can be used to build more specic RELs. At the moment, most DRM systems
do not use the full expressiveness of current RELs (or do not use it at all). But as time will pass,
they will become increasingly exible in dening rights.
1.4.3 Associating rights to protected content
As we have mentioned before, rights are dened by usage rules. These have to be associated with
the digital content. The rights have to be bound to a specic piece of protected content. In the
past, attempts were made to embed usage rules in an imperceptible way into the content itself.
This approach, followed by SDMI [38] - which used a watermark, failed [57].
A second and inexible method still used today is dening a xed, technology dependent set
of usage rules. In this case, each piece of content that is protected using a particular DRM
technology has associated with it the same set of usage rules. For example, each piece of content
protected using FairPlay (see Section 3.2), can be copied no more than four times. Clearly, this
approach is too rigid and has serious drawbacks: content producers should, for instance, accept
the consumption limitations which the DRM company stipulated, and business models such as
pay-per-view are not possible.
The third and most exible method introduces the concept of licenses. Here, a separation
between content and (sets of) usage rules is made: on the one hand we have protected content and
on the other hand we have licenses containing usage rules corresponding to that protected content.
Dierent license types can correspond to the same content. Sometimes, one license contains usage
rules corresponding to multiple pieces of content. The producer of a sitcom, such as 'Friends', can
use for example one license for a complete season.
In the remainder of the text, we will focus on the license scheme, combined with contracts.
1.4.4 Specifying dierent sets of rights
Dierent sets of rights corresponding to the same piece of content can be specied, resulting in
dierent license types. Dierent users can thus have dierent rights on the same content.
Content owners or their delegates that are able to submit content to a DRM system (i.e. what
we call the producers) often want to specify the license types themselves, i.e. they want to specify
dierent sets of usage rules specifying the rights that can be obtained. The producer also wants to
set some business information, such as the price and distribution period, for the dierent license
types. All this information is combined in a contract associated with the submitted content. This
contract contains all information that is needed by the online DRM system to issue dierent license
types.
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Figure 2: A typical DRM use case: a consumer uses its DRM client to contact an online Content
Service and search for content. Only when a license has been acquired via the License Service,
content can be consumed.
Figure 3: License usage
1.4.5 Distributing content and rights
Before consumers are able to use protected content, they rst have to obtain it along with a
corresponding license that enables them to use the content according to the usage rules described
therein. In a typical, simplied scenario, which is illustrated in Figure 2, a consumer uses its DRM
client to contact an online Content Service (1). This service enables to look up and download
protected content (2). Content can be consumed , after a license has been requested (if it is required
by the DRM technology) (3) and acquired (4) via the License Service using super-distribution (for
example free licenses) or another distribution channel.
Instead of distributing content using online services, another scenario called super-distribution
is possible. Super-distribution allows the distribution of the protected content using peer-to-
peer networks, portable media, e-mail, FTP, etc. In fact, any way of distributing the protected
content is allowed. This fastens the spreading of the protected content and lowers the load on the
Content Service drastically. When one obtains the protected content this way, still a corresponding
license has to be obtained by contacting the License Service. Not all technologies provide super-
distribution. In most cases, one will have to pay before a license can be obtained. Free licenses
can also be useful to the content producer. For example, a license with very limited usage rules
can be issued for free and allows the consumer to hear the rst 60 seconds of the corresponding
song. To be able to hear the full song, another license oering a less restrictive set of rights has
to be bought.
1.4.6 Using content
Licenses are not only bound to protected content, but also to one or more specic devices or persons
that are legitimate consumers. Only these specic devices or persons are able to consume the
corresponding protected content using that license. Distributing a license to other, unauthorized
parties is thus useless. The DRM Client on the device is responsible for the enforcement of the
rights: no other rights than these specied by the usage rules in the license may be possible by
the consuming entity. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
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1.5 Summary of requirements
This section presents the main requirements concerning three dimensions: security, exibility, and
network eciency. These requirements will be used to validate state-of-the-art DRM technologies
and to check to what extent each of them balances these three dimensions.
1.5.1 Security requirements
1. Core of the solution.
 Controlled distribution of rights. Licenses may only be issued to authorized parties and
the distribution of usage rules in a license must be according to the distribution rules
in that license.
 Controlled consumption of content. Digital content may only be consumed respecting
the obtained rights. It has to be impossible to do more with the digital content than
described in the usage rules in the license. If no license is found, the digital content
cannot be consumed.
 Fraud Detection. Even if digital content has been extracted out of his DRM context
(e.g. by recording the output generated by a sound card), it must still be possible to
detect mass abuse of such content. Imagine the DRM protection of a movie had been
removed and the new le is spread on a le sharing network, it must still be possible
to detect the source of the misuse.
The rst two requirements are prevention requirements, while the last is a detection require-
ment in case prevention failed or was circumvented.
2. Reliability and robustness of the solution.
 Permanent protection. The content storage and transmission must be protected at all
times. Content stored on servers or consumer devices must be protected in such a way
it cannot be read by unauthorized parties. Eavesdropper must not be able to consume
the content, even if they can observe all interactions between the online DRM System,
the consumer and the producer.
 Tight coupling between content, license and consumer.
{ A license, although physically separated from the content, must logically be as-
sociated with it. A license may only be used for consuming the corresponding
content.
{ It must be possible to verify the validity of both licenses and content.
{ A license can only be used by the legitimate consumer on legitimate devices.
 Renewability. When certain software parts in a DRM client are compromised or no
longer considered secure due to new security threats, it must be possible to replace
these by better parts. If, for example, the watermarking scheme used in a DRM system
is broken, it must be possible to replace it. DRM Clients that are considered insecure
(because they are not yet renewed), can be denied to use services oered by the online
DRM service.
 Revocation. It must be possible to revoke a device that has been fully compromised.
Obtaining new licenses becomes impossible for that device.
 Tamper-resistant usage rules. It must be impossible to change the usage rules described
in the license.
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1.5.2 Flexibility requirements
1. Overall applicability of a solution
 Rich content. It must be possible to protect any type of content, including rich content.
Each sub item in the rich content can have its own rights. A set of images, for example,
can be used freely by everyone, while a piece of audio contained in the same content
may not.
 Expressive usage rules. It must be possible to dene and enforce in a exible way the
usage rules that were described in the previous section, and future extensions of the
rule set.
 Ubiquitous consumption. It must be possible for the consumer to consume DRM pro-
tected content with the license on any DRM-enabled device.
 Application Programming Interface (API) available. The API must be oered such that
developers can integrate DRM functionality in their own applications.
 Multi-platform. The DRM technology must be portable to dierent platforms.
 Producer tool. A tool must be oered enabling content producers to add their content
and corresponding contracts to the DRM System.
 Publisher tool. A tool must be oered enabling the content publisher to maintain the
system.
 Easy use. Using a DRM client must be as easy as possible. A diculty that can occur
is the necessity of certicates. Not all consumers have one at the moment.
2. Supporting dierent exploitation models
 Super-distribution. The load on the content server is heavily decreased while spreading
of the content is fastened.
 Rights gift. One should be able to buy rights (e.g. in the form of a license) for someone
else.
 Recoverability. After a system crash, consumers should be able to recover all their
digital content and their rights to consume and distribute it.
 Easy payment. The consumer has to be able to easily perform payments, enabling
him/her to buy various licenses. Dierent business models are possible, such as pay-
per-consume, subscription, pre-pay and pay-per-license basis.
 Fair-use. DRM is potentially to restrictive. The consumers of DRM protected content
want to be allowed to do everything they were used to do with content before the DRM
era. They still want to be able to do small scale copying to dierent devices, friends,
family, etc. and they want to consume content without restrictions. Of course severe
violations of the law must be made impossible by DRM. This principle is called fair-use.
1.5.3 Eciency requirements
 Minimal network trac. The number of messages between client and server has to be
minimized. Also, the size of the message must be minimized.
 Minimal client resource usage. Both processor and memory usage by the DRM client to
perform its actions need to be minimized. Is special hardware needed at the consumer side?
As this report will show, it is not always possible to fulll all of these requirements with the
current state-of-the-art technologies. Some requirements can be considered as long term goals
and some even contradict each other. For example, the super-distribution requirement is not
compatible with the fraud-detection mechanism.
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2 A generic DRM Architecture
Having sketched the working principles in recent DRM technologies, this section proposes a generic
DRM architecture using the state-of-the-art concepts discussed in the previous section.
First, the high level DRM functionality is studied from dierent viewpoints (Section 2.1),
followed by an identication of the main services that should be present in Section 2.2. Section 2.3
integrates security technologies by locating the security hot spots in the architecture and showing
how security services can be established in particular hot spots using dierent cryptographic
primitives.
2.1 Application level viewpoints
What is needed at application level to have a complete DRM system? In order to answer this
question, three main roles are distinguished: the consumer, the producer and the publisher. In
addition, some external roles are briey discussed. Identifying multiple roles in a DRM system is
crucial to view the complete picture.
Consumer. Consumers want to consume protected content in a user-friendly way. They
want to be able to browse the content catalog of the online DRM system where the content
at stake can be obtained. Since consumers also need a license, they must be able to select a
license type and view the usage rules , in a human readable format, associated with it. Generally,
consumers rst have to pay, one way or another; dierent business models should be possible
(e.g. subscription, pay-per-license, or pay-per-use). When time-based licenses expire, it must be
possible to update them, which may also require some nancial transaction. Consumers also want
to browse their obtained licenses locally and view the usage rules in a human readable format.
Finally, consumers want to consume the protected content, according to the usage rules associated
with the corresponding license. In order to fetch licenses (and sometimes also protected content),
consumers need to authenticate to the online DRM system.
Producer. Producers want to easily compose a contract. Both content and contract must be
submitted to the online DRM system. After some time, they may want to update the contract
or maybe even cancel it, i.e. stop the distribution of the content. Content producers expect a
nancial compensation from the DRM service for the trade of their content. Therefore, they want
to receive statistical information from the DRM service about the number of downloads or content
usage patterns. In order to query or submit content to the online DRM system, content producers
need to authenticate themselves.
Publisher. When one or more DRM clients are no longer secure, their right to consume
content must be revoked. It may also be necessary to update some parts of the DRM system
(and the DRM client). Content publishers may want an overview of system usage patterns. When
content is found mass-distributed, the source of abuse must be identiable. Publishers need to
authenticate to the DRM system rst.
External roles. Some other roles include the nancial institution that oers support for
billing issues, and the owner of the network that is used to distribute content and licenses. When
certicates are used, an external Certication Authority (CA) is needed to obtain certicates and
to check the validity of certicates.
2.2 Core components
The previous section presented the main requirements from multiple application-level viewpoints.
We are now able to discuss the dierent high level services and interactions that are needed in
a complete DRM system to provide this application-level functionality. We rst identify services
needed from the consumer's viewpoint, and subsequently add the services needed from the pro-
ducer's and the publisher's viewpoint. The last part of this section denes the interfaces and ports
for each component in our general architecture.
We will put these entities together in a general high-level architecture using UML. We split the
architecture in three views. The rst view, shown in Figure 4, illustrates the interactions between
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the online DRM system and the consumer. The second view, shown in Figure 5, focuses on the
interactions between the online DRM system and the producer. The third view, shown in Figure
6, illustrates the interactions between the online DRM system and the publisher.
We rst briey explain some UML notation [41] we use in the gures to come. First of all,
there are number of rectangles, called components. A component is a logical part of an application,
consisting of several classes. A component only interacts with other components using predened
interfaces (synchronous) or ports (asynchronous). An interface is dened by a set of methods
and is indicated graphically by a circle, connected with his component using a simple line. If a
component can communicate with an interface of another component, an arrowed line is drawn
from the former component to the specic interface of the latter component. A port only accepts
or sends a certain type of messages; we only have to dene these messages. A port is indicated
by a small rectangle at the border of a component. Both sender and receiver of the asynchronous
communication have a port. These ports are connected using an arrowed line, indicating the
direction of the communication. A component can be distributed, but abstraction is made and
they are seen as logical units. An extensive description can be found in [58].
2.2.1 Content consumer
We identify four key DRM services with respect to the content consumer: the Content Service,
the License Service, the Access Service, and the Tracking Service. In addition, we describe two
external services for payment and certication. See also Figure 4.
Content Service. When consumers want to obtain protected content, they use their DRM
Client to contact the Content Service where they can search for content. Before a consumer obtains
any content, the Content Service protects it. Since this protected content may be personalized, the
Content Service needs certainty about the identity of the consumer. This is obtained by interaction
(i.e. running a protocol) between the Content Service, the DRM Client and the Access Service.
This identication phase, however, is not always needed. Dropping it disables the detection
mechanism in case of mass-abuse but allows for super-distribution. The Content Service may
need to send protection data, specic to that piece of content, to the License Service, to allow this
service to issue associated licenses. The Content Service receives its content and potentially some
additional data from the Import Service, which is discussed in the producer part.
License Service. Once the License Service has received the protection data from the Content
Service, it is able to issue corresponding licenses upon consumer request. The License Service may
oer dierent license types corresponding to the same content. The consumer requires a description
of the dierent types and selects one. The consumer's DRM client provides some system or user
specic parameters to generate a license that is only usable by that consumer. Before the license
is issued, the consumer usually has to pay for it. Therefore, the License Service asks the Access
Service if it may issue the license. The Access Service in turn contacts the external Payment
Service and will only answer positively if the consumer has eectively paid. Expired licenses can
be updated by sending them to the License Service, which will issue new ones to the consumer,
often after a new payment. The License Service may also send statistical information about the
license issuance to the Tracking Service. The Content Service receives its contracts and potentially
some additional data from the Import Service, which is explained in the content producer part
(see section 2.2.2).
Access Service. The Access Service is responsible for the authentication of the content
producers, consumers (or its DRM clients) and publisher. It is also responsible for checking
payments of both consumers and producers before allowing particular actions on the DRM system.
The Access Service may, for example, deny access if some bills are not paid or if consumers fail to
identify themselves.
Before content consumers are able to obtain licenses or even content, some registration pro-
cedure may be necessary beforehand. This procedure usually involves the Access Service and, if
some nancial transaction is needed, the External Payment Service.
Tracking Service. The DRMClient, the License Service and the Content Service can generate
statistical usage information (e.g. the number of times a piece of content is downloaded, the type
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Figure 4: Content Consumer view on the generic architecture
of licenses issued for it, or the number of times it is consumed). These components (or a subset)
can forward such information to the Tracking Service, which in turn can produce usage statistics.
Payment Service (external). The nancial aspects are taken care of by an external Payment
Service, typically a bank or another nancial institution. Obviously, some interaction is needed
between the external Payment Service, the Access Service and the DRM client, producer tool or
consumer tool.
Certication Authority (external) is only necessary if certicates are used. The CA is
responsible for the issuance, distribution and revocation of certicates.
2.2.2 Content producer
We describe three main DRM services oered to content producers: the Import Service, the
Tracking Service and the Compensation Service. See also Figure 5.
Import Service. Before producers can put content into the DRM system by contacting the
Import Service, they must identify themselves via the Access Service. This is necessary to prevent
misuse of the DRM system: only the owners of the rights on the content may submit that content
to the DRM system. After identication, the producer can submit the content to the Import
Service, including meta-data and a corresponding contract. Upon receipt, the Import Service
may rst convert and manipulate the content such that the DRM system is able to deal with
it. Subsequently, the content is sent to the Content Service, while the contract and additional
information (such as the content identier) are send to the License Service. In a similar way,
content can be updated or removed from the DRM system.
Tracking Service. Producers can also ask the Tracking Service for usage statistics corre-
sponding to their content and can check, by contacting the external Payment Service, if they are
compensated accordingly.
Compensation Service. At regular times, on a monthly basis for example, the content
producer gets a compensation for the trading of his content by the online DRM System. Therefore,
the Compensation Service rst asks the Tracking Service the necessary statistical information and
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Figure 5: Content Producer view on the generic architecture
then contacts the external Payment Service to pay the content producer. The Compensation
Service can also compensate other parties, such as the owner of the physical network.
2.2.3 Content publisher
The content publisher uses three major DRM services: the Access Service, the Identication
Service, and the Tracking Service. See also Figure 6.
Access Service. The publisher rst of all authenticates to the DRM System using the Access
Service. Secondly, the Access Service allows the publisher to revoke a single DRM client or a
whole class of clients, for example all DRM clients that have not yet been renewed after a security
threat.
Identication Service. The publisher can send content that is found on mass-distribution
networks to the Identication Service, which will reveal the identity of the source of abuse.
Tracking Service. Similar to the other roles, the content publisher is also able to obtain
statistical information about the use of the DRM System.
2.2.4 Component interfaces
Now we have described the DRM system from content consumer, content producer and content
publisher point of view, we list the dierent component interfaces.
License Service. The consumer contacts the license interface to get a list of the dier-
ent license types (getLicenseTypes(contentId:String):List), wants to obtain a license (getLi-
cense(contentId:String, licenseTypeId:String, params:Params):License) and wants, after some
time, to update his expired licenses (updateLicense(oldLicense:License):License).
The Import Service can add a new contract (addContract(contract:Contract)), can option-
ally submit some key data resulting from the pre-packaging (addKeyData(contentId:String,
2.2 Core components 16
Figure 6: Content publisher view on the generic architecture
keyData:KeyData):boolean), can update a contract (updateContract(oldContractId, newCon-
tract):boolean) and stop the License Service from spreading licenses corresponding to a certain
piece of content (remove(contentId:String):boolean).
Content Service. The content consumer can search for specic content
(search(query:String):List) and can, potentially after a necessary identication, obtain some
specic content (getContent(contentId:String):Content).
The Import Service can add new content (addContent(content:Content):boolean) and stop
content from being provided by the DRM system (removeContent (contentId:String):boolean).
Tracking Service. The Tracking Service oers a public interface oering statistical infor-
mation (getStatisticalInfo(params:Params):StatisticalInfo). Identication is needed beforehand.
The tracking Service also receives messages containing statistical information gathered by the
License Service, the Content Service or the DRM Client of the consumer.
Import Service. The Import Service oers the content producer an interface to submit
new content to the DRM system (addContent(content:Content, contract:Contract):boolean), to
update an existing contract (updateContract(contentId:String, contract:Contract):boolean) and
to stop the distribution of content (stopDistribution(contentId:String):boolean). Identication is
needed beforehand.
Compensation Service. The compensation Service has no explicit interface, but is trig-
gered. A simple interface can be provided to the content publisher to check if compensations are
done accordingly and to do some manually.
Access Service. The Access Service has to oer a way to the Content Producer, the
content consumer (and/or their DRM clients) and the content publisher to prove their identity
and right to do some actions (authenticate(. . . )). This can be done in a number of ways (certicate
based, subscription based, . . . ). The DRM System wants to know if a consumer or consumer is
allowed to do certain actions (isAuthorized(user:User, action:Action, parmas:Params):boolean).
The content publisher can revoke a single DRM client (revokeClient(clientId, String):boolean) or
a class of DRM clients (revokeClientClass(params:Params)).
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External Payment Service. The external Payment Service is not a part of our general
architecture. The methods we need are rather basic and will typically be present: we need
a method to transfer money from one account to another (doPayment(money:Amount, Ac-
count:String):boolean) and one to check if a bill is already paid (checkPayment(bill:String)).
Identication Service. This service oers an interface to extract the identity from mass
distributed content (revealIdentity(content:Content):Identity)
2.3 Integrating security technologies
While the previous section focused on the main functional components of a generic DRM archi-
tecture, this section switches attention to security. It rst identies hot spots in the architecture
that highlight where to inject specic security services to establish a secure DRM system. Sec-
ondly, it provides an overview of the main cryptographic primitives and means that are required
to implement the security services.
2.3.1 Locating security hot spots
Where in the proposed architecture should one inject specic security services to establish a
secure DRM system? The major security services that are identied are unforgeability, integrity,
authentication, condentiality, non-repudiation, and anonymity. We discuss what services are
needed to secure licenses, protected content, contracts, newly submitted content, the online DRM
system and the consumer system.
Licenses. A secure license must rst of all be unforgeable, meaning that it should be impossible
to parties other than the License Server to construct a valid license. A second important property
to be guaranteed is integrity, i.e. any change in a license will be detected and thus becomes invalid.
Thirdly, a license must be uniquely bound to its corresponding content and to the owner of the
license. Consumers authenticate themselves to a device which contacts the License Service on
behalf of the consumer. This results in a person-bound license. It is still dicult in practice to
associate with every person a certicate, and thus to bind a license to a physical person. Binding
to one or more devices owned by that person is often applied instead. Initiatives, such as e-ID[14],
may solve this problem.
Content When a content producer submits new content, a third party may not tamper with
(integrity) or have access to (condentiality) it. Authentication must be possible to determine who
is responsible for the content submission to the DRM system. The protected content spread by
the Content Service should only be consumable by owners of a legal corresponding license; to all
others, condentiality of the content is needed. Practice has shown that it is very hard to prevent
consumers from getting hold of the content in an unprotected way. For this reason, the Content
Service may also need to apply a detection mechanism on the unprotected content to support
non-repudiation when mass-abuse is detected.
Contracts. If a person illegally submitted content to the DRM system, one must be able to
prove that this person committed a violation. This requires authentication and non-repudiation,
such that the suspect cannot deny the facts. Integrity also protects against tampering by a third
party.
Consumer system. At the system of the consumer, only entities (such as the operating
system, a sound card, or a DRM client) that can authenticate themselves as trustworthy may
become authorized to get hold of the content in an unprotected way. In this way, condentiality
of the content is maintained. Integrity of authorized software entities should be maintained; if
not, one might as well insert a Trojan horse that sends unprotected content to a le or another
party. Because the rights dened in licenses are often time related, there is a need for secure time:
it should be impossible to use an expired license by simply changing the system time. Another
important property for DRM clients is individualization, which reduces the danger of global breaks
if one specic DRM client is compromised.
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Online DRM system. In the DRM system, sensitive data (unprotected content, key data)
are stored and sent from one component to another. For example, the License Service holds secret
data that are needed for creating valid licenses. Thus, condentiality is needed and integrity must
be kept for both the sending and storing of sensitive data. When sensitive data are sent from
one component to another, mutual authentication is needed. When usage information is sent to
the Usage Tracking Server, the anonymity of the sender must be respected. No third party may
change the statistical information. This requires again integrity and authentication of both the
sending and the receiving component. No replay-attacks are allowed to prevent usage information
being sent more than once.
2.3.2 A reference to basic cryptographic primitives
Although both hardware and software mechanisms exist to build secure DRM systems, we focus
specically on software solutions that can be integrated in the generic DRM architecture. We in-
vestigate what cryptographic primitives can be used to establish the cryptographic building blocks
presented in the previous section. We discuss the main cryptographic primitives, such as encryp-
tion, digital signatures, certicates, watermarking and secure clocks. At the end, we introduce
some key paradigms and techniques to obtain integrity of the DRM client and condentiality of
protected content.
Encryption. One of the most accepted and most used cryptographic primitives, which con-
verts readable data into cipher text [73]. Converting the cipher text back into readable data, which
is only possible by authorized parties, is called decryption. A key is needed for both encryption
and decryption. We distinguish two kinds of encryption/decryption:
 Symmetric encryption and decryption uses the same key. Examples are DES, triple DES
and AES.
 Asymmetric decryption requires another key than asymmetric encryption. The decryption
key cannot be derived from the encryption key. Typical examples are RSA, Rabin and
ElGamal.
Typically, symmetric encryption is considerably faster because it needs smaller keys for the
same level of security. Encryption may be used for condentiality, both for storing and sending
data: only the entities possessing the key can obtain the plain text.
User specic parameters such as biometric data, a unique token, a private key corresponding to
a user certicate, system parameters (CPU id, etc.), ... can be used (combined or not) to generate
a key(pair) in order to obtain device or person binding.
Digital signatures. A digital signature aims to guarantee the integrity and unforgeability of
the signed data, yet may provide some other properties as well [73]. Digital signatures can only be
placed using a private key and can only be veried using a corresponding public key. The private
key is kept secret and is impossible to derive from the public key. Some digital signatures schemes
are RSA, DSA and Schnorr.
Hashes. A hash function is a transformation H with input m of random length, and output h
of xed length (thus h = G(m)). The output h is called the hash of the input m. A cryptographic
hash function has the following properties: it is easy to calculate the output if one has the input.
However, if the output is known, it is computationally infeasible to calculate the corresponding
input (one way). In addition, it is computationally infeasible to obtain two inputs m and m' with
the same hashvalue (i.e. H(m) = H(m')). Examples of hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1.
Certicates. A certicate guarantees the binding of a public key with the identity of the
signer [73]. In principle, every entity can obtain a certicate of another entity by using a PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure). Certicates thus enable authentication of the sole entity having the
corresponding private key. Certicates may be revoked. The most common certicate type is
X.509. Using specic hardware (or even software) parameters of the device or computer as key
data, a client application can obtain a certicate, binding the application to the device. When
the application is copied to another device or computer, its certicate runs invalid. Since the
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corresponding private key can only be derived using these hardware parameters, certicates enable
individualization of the client applications (such as a DRM client).
Watermarking [62] embeds some information into digital images, video, audio and some
other data structures (not including text documents) without noticeably changing the content.
The watermark has to be undetectable by human perception capacity. We distinguish between
weak and strong watermarks.
Strong watermarks survive content manipulations such as D/A (Digital/Analog) A/D (Ana-
log/Digital) conversion, conversion to other formats (e.g. MP3 to AAC), compression and decom-
pression. They may be detected, changed or removed without loss of quality using the correspond-
ing key. Without this key, the watermark can only be removed or damaged causing very serious
degrading of quality. When identication information of the content owner signed by that owner
is embedded as a watermark into the content itself, the content is bound to the owner, which
implies non-repudiation. Of course, it is possible to embed other information. Yet, the quantity
of information that can be embedded is generally rather limited, because the imperceptible part
of the audio, video or image data is rather small.
Weak watermarks disappear when certain, predetermined manipulations are performed on the
content (e.g. D/A A/D conversion), but survive others (e.g. compression). This type of watermark
is ideal for checking the integrity of content.
Although rather good watermarks exist for images and video, sound is more troublesome.
Designing a watermark that survives some of the requirements, such as robustness, imperceptibility
or data rate, is possible, but designing one that fullls all of these simultaneously has shown to
be very dicult. It is one of the least mature technologies used in DRM.
Secure clocks are clocks that cannot be changed by their owners and prevent system time
tampering, thus providing secure time. A secure clock is usually a hardware clock.
2.3.3 Other techniques
Next to the traditional cryptographic primitives, some other techniques are necessary to obtain
integrity of the DRM client as well as condentiality of the protected content and sensitive secret
key information that the consumer may not obtain. It must be impossible, or at least very hard
for a consumer to get hold of the decryption key or the decrypted content. This is far from trivial
because the DRM client is installed on a computer or device that the consumer potentially fully
controls. Besides expensive hardware solutions, some software solutions already exist or are in the
research pipeline. A key player on the commercial market is Cloakware [4]. Cloakware is active
on each of the techniques summed up here.
Trusted computing [48, 40] is a paradigm used to keep sensitive material within a trusted
environment. Data are always sent from one entity to another. In a consumer environment, an
entity can be a software application that sends the decrypted content to the operating system,
which in turn sends it to an output device (sound card, video card, etc.) or to an external
device. The idea is that the next entity in the chain rst of all convinces the previous entity
that the content it receives will stay inside a safe environment. Therefore, authentication as safe
entity is needed, which can be provided using certicates that may be revoked when the entity
is compromised. Secondly, when the protected content is consumed (and thus has to become
unprotected at some point) the non-authenticated hard- and software is disabled. The Trusted
Computing Group (TCG [40]), an alliance of Microsoft, Intel, IBM, HP and AMD, develops and
promotes open specications for trusted computing.
Code obfuscation [77] is a collection of techniques used to hide (part of) a program's im-
plementation details and functionality from its (potentially adversary) user. Obfuscation involves
a number of transformations on the program, which results in a new program that it is much
harder to analyze. obfuscators are Zelix Klassmaster [45] and Semantic Designs [39]. When an
entity wants to download an application, the server can individualize it by applying code obfus-
cation based on the hardware parameters provided by that entity. Each client has thus a separate
executable.
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White-box cryptography [54] [66] assumes that the adversary has total visibility of the
software implementation and execution of cryptographic functions, and thus also of the key in-
formation. For critical functions, extra input and output encoding is applied, which results in a
new, stronger function. White-box cryptography can be very useful to hide key information in a
software DRM client installed on the computer of the consumer. Otherwise, the adversary could
get hold of the content decryption key info by extracting the secret data out of the DRM client.
Self checking [63] refers to the checking of the code integrity (i.e. tamper resistance) by the
application itself while running. Static integrity checking checks the code only once; at start-up-
time. Dynamic self-checking veries the code integrity of the application multiple times during
execution.
Fingerprinting A ngerprint is a content-based compact signature that summarizes a media
recording. A ngerprinting function F should map a media object M, consisting of a large number
of bits, to a ngerprint V of a relatively small number of bits. The algorithm F uses unique
properties of M (e.g. beats per minute, bitrate, . . . ) to generate V. The ngerprint V will
typically be used in a database application as an index to the metadata of the corresponding
media M.
2.3.4 Establishing security services
Section 2.3.1 located security hot spots and identied the necessary security services. This section
outlines how these security services can be established in particular hot spots. Since the same secu-
rity service may be established by dierent cryptographic primitives, depending on the situation,
this section presents a mapping between security hot spots and cryptographic primitives that can
be used to secure them (e.g. digital signatures, certicates, encryption, and digital watermarks).
Licenses. Unforgeability and integrity can be realized by applying digital signatures. Binding
the license to its corresponding content can be done by inserting a unique identier of the content
in the license. Such an identier may be a hash of the data, a ngerprint of the content, a Digital
Object Identier [47], or some other kind of identication. The content can be bound with a user
can be done by inserting the user's personal certicate or a unique identier of that certicate.
Content. When content is submitted, the combination of digital signatures and certicates can
be used to obtain integrity and authentication. Condentiality can be obtained using encryption.
Obtaining condentiality of DRM protected content has shown to be far from trivial. Content
may be encrypted with a key that can only be reconstructed by a specic DRM client, potentially
with the help of the consumer. Key reconstruction may depend on hardware specic parameters
such as the CPU serial number. Another possibility is putting key data in the corresponding
licenses. Non-repudiation in the detection mechanism of protected content can be obtained by a
combination of digital signatures, certicates and watermarking. Identifying data signed by the
consumer can be embedded as watermark in the content before it is encrypted.
Contracts. Integrity, authentication and non-repudiation can be obtained by using digital
signatures combined with certicates.
Consumer system. To obtain authentication of the dierent trustworthy entities, combined
with condentiality of the sensitive data, Trusted Computing [48] techniques can be used. To
decrypt the DRM protected content, the DRM client needs a secret key that is not known to
the consumer. To prevent consumers or other entities from getting hold of the secret decryption
data, white box cryptography [53] can be used. Such key data can also be used to maintain
condentiality of license status info (e.g how often it has already been consumed). To obtain
integrity of the DRM client (and possibly other software entities) self checking techniques [63]
can be used. Code obfuscation [77] is a usable technique to hinder sensitive code analysis. It
also provides a way for individualization. To obtain secure time, one can use secure clocks, i.e.
tamper-resistant hardware clocks.
Online DRM System. Condentiality can be obtained using encryption, integrity using
digital signatures and authentication using digital certicates. Anonymity can be obtained by
removing any identifying data out of the usage information, while the usage information itself is
sent to the Tracking Service using anonymizers [72]. By using digital signatures for authentication,
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anonymity would be lost. Therefore, zero-knowledge proofs [67] that contain the usage information
should be used instead.
2.4 Summary
In this section we have presented the main requirements for a DRM system, and used them to
build a generic DRM architecture. In addition, we have discussed how security technologies can
be integrated in the architecture: we located security hot spots in the architecture, presented
the cryptographic primitives needed to build a secure DRM system, and discussed how low level
cryptographic primitives can be used to establish the security components. We are now able to
discuss the most important proprietary technologies and map their architecture on the generic
architecture presented in this section.
3 State-of-the-art DRM technologies
In this section we provide an overview of the state-of-the-art in DRM by presenting publicly
available information on eleven DRM technologies: Windows Media DRM (WMDRM), FairPlay,
Adobe PDF Merchant/Web Buy, Light Weight DRM (LWDRM), Electronic Media Management
System (EMMS), OMA, Intertrust, DMDSecure, Helix DRM, AegisDRM, and SealedMedia.
In Sections 3.1 to 3.6, we discuss the rst six technologies from seven perspectives: context,
architecture, security model, licenses and rights expression, known security attacks, security eval-
uation, and exibility evaluation. The architecture perspective discusses the main DRM service
components that are oered by each technology, and shows the relationship between these com-
ponents by mapping them on the generic architecture that we presented in Section 2. After this
in-depth discussion we briey present the other ve DRM technologies in Section 3.7. We conclude
the overview in Section 3.8 by comparing the eleven DRM technologies based on their support for
the security and exibility requirements that we presented in Section 1.5.
3.1 Windows Media DRM
3.1.1 Context
Microsoft Windows Media DRM (WMDRM [29]) allows protection of audio and video content. It
is used in Windows Media Player and uses the Advanced Streaming Format (ASF), the Windows
Media Audio (WMA) format, or the Windows Media Video (WMV) format to protect content.
WMDRM oers a set of Software Development Kits (SDKs), which are freely available, and some
tools that help to set up DRM services. WMDRM protected content can be played on a Windows
PC or portable device.
3.1.2 Architecture
WMDRM does not really provide a xed architecture or (a set of) deployable applications. It
consists of a set of SDKs that allow to use the core DRM services and combine them into various
congurations. The following service components are oered in WMDRM:
 Content Packaging: protect compressed media
 Content Hosting: host and distribute digital media content
 License Clearinghouse: issue licenses and track transactions
 Content Playback: play protected digital media
 Portable Device Playback: transfer and play protected digital media
 Network Device Playback: play digital media from a remote source
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Figure 7: Possible simplied WMDRM architecture
In order to see how these service components can be combined into an overall DRM system,
we map them on the generic DRM architecture. Figure 7 illustrates a relevant mapping and
shows how each generic component maps onto a WMDRM component. As opposed to the generic
architecture, WMDRM does not provide components for the Access Service and the Payment
Service. In addition, the generic architecture distinguishes the Tracking Service and the License
Service as separate components, while WMDRM combines these two in the License Clearinghouse
component.
The architecture shown in Figure 7 is one of the possible architectures using SDKs oered by
WMDRM. For clarity reasons, we have split the functionality of the Clearinghouse into a tracking
and a licensing component. The gure does not show the access and payment components. We
now discuss the individual components presented in this architecture.
Import Service. This service uses the Content Packaging SDK and has the same func-
tionality as the Import Service in our generic architecture. It receives unprotected content and
corresponding contracts from the content producer. It converts and protects the content and
sends this result to the Content Service, while the protection data and contracts are sent to the
License Service.
License Service. This service uses the License Clearinghouse SDK and has the same
functionality as the License Service in our generic architecture. It receives the contracts and
protection data from the Import Service.
Content Service. This service uses the Content Hosting SDK and corresponds to the
Content Service in the generic architecture. It distributes content, but super-distribution is also
possible. Both streaming and le download are supported. Also live streaming is possible.
Tracking Service. This service also uses the License Clearinghouse SDK and corresponds to
the Tracking Service in the generic architecture. It gets its data from the dierent players. These
data do not contain any identication data.
DRM Client. This component uses the Content Playback SDK.
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3.1.3 Security model
The Packaging Service converts content to ASF, WMA or WMV. Also, an encryption key is
generated from a secret master license key seed and a unique content key ID. The master license
key seed is only known by the Import Service and the License Service. The key ID is put in the
header of the le together with the URL of the license acquisition. The content is encrypted by the
Import Service using the encryption key. The encryption is independent of the rights specication,
which has the advantage that dierent sets of rights can be set for one protected le and rights
can be changed without re-encrypting the content.
The License Service receives the content key ID from the Import Service. The License Service
also knows the master license key seed and is able to reconstruct the content key, which is encrypted
using the public key corresponding to the private key on the client device. This encrypted key
and system parameters of the client device are part of the license. By consequence, the license
is bound to the device. Also, a certicate obtained from the License Service is appended. The
license is signed with the private key corresponding to that certicate.
WMDRM uses code individualization, renewability and revocation. The online DRM system
can refuse service to DRM clients that are not yet renewed. Revocation is applied at two levels.
Firstly, a blacklist with individual compromised clients can be checked. Secondly, it is possible to
revoke third party players. Another technique is Secure Audio Path. This prevents interception of
the audio on the data path inside the operating system during transfer from the media player to
the sound card. A certied Microsoft component veries that all downstream entities (including
the sound card driver) are also certied. This is a kind of trusted computing. For DRM client
security, Microsoft collaborates with Cloakware [4].
3.1.4 Licenses and right expression
WMDRM licenses are described by using the MPEG-21 rights expression language (REL). WM-
DRM licenses can specify varying usage restrictions, such as the number of times content can be
played, time-related constraints, number of allowed copies, editing rules, or the required security
level. In addition, licenses can enforce management rules that state, for instance, that playback
on compromised or out-of-date systems must be prevented, or that periodic security updates are
required. WMDRM licenses are device bound. The fair-use principle is not oered.
A consumer can download licenses directly and indirectly. A license can be acquired directly
by a computer or device when it is connected to the Internet. Indirect license acquisition requires
an intermediate computer proxy. In this case, the device is (temporarily) connected to a computer
that contains licenses. If the license allows copies, the computer proxy can issue a new license
to that device. This is enabled by a technology called "WMDRM 10 for portable devices". It is
also possible to send content to authorized devices within a specied environment (e.g. a home
network). This is enabled by a technology called "WMDRM 10 for Network Devices".
Some techniques used for licensing are worth mentioning:
 License updating. Expired or almost expired licenses can be updated quickly when con-
nected to the Internet.
 License chaining. A root license can have several leaf licenses. A leaf license contains
specic information about one piece of content (e.g. how many times it can be played). The
root license is bound to a device and may, for instance, specify an overall validity period
(e.g. one month). This allows to update a whole set of licenses by only updating the root
license.
 Support for secure clocks. This allows the issuing of time-based licenses.
 Output protection. A license can specify what kinds of output a device may or may
not produce (video/audio, digital/analog) and what kinds of security primitives must be
attached to these outputs (e.g. Secure Audio Path).
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Several license delivery scenarios are possible: pre-delivery (before the usage of the content),
post-delivery (after the user tried to use protected content), silent delivery (without a dialog with
the customer), or non-silent delivery (requires a dialog with the customer).
3.1.5 Attacks
A programmer with pseudonym "Beale Screamer" has released some documents [17] at the end
of 2001 where he explains his vision on DRM together with the technical and security aspect of
WMDRM. He also oered a tool called "FreeMe", which removes the WMDRM v2 protection
of a WMA le. This is only possible when the user has a corresponding valid license. Because
WMDRM does not use watermarks, the source of the abuse cannot be identied. Microsoft has
been able to x the security hole introduced by \Beale Screamer". Since Windows Media Player
is integrated in the Windows operating system, the xes could be downloaded and installed using
the Windows Update tool.
Recently (August 2005), an unconrmed message has been posted on the Internet announcing
that WMDRM 10 has been cracked: with the help of a valid license, the DRM protection can be
removed.
3.1.6 Security evaluation
WMDRM does not support watermarks, so there is no fraud detection system as second line
of defense. The control on distribution and consumption was broken in 2001 but thanks to the
renewability property it has been xed fairly quickly. Yet, the fact that it might have been
broken again in August 2005 indicates that features such as permanent protection, tight coupling
between content, rights and consumer, and tamper resistance are under pressure. Revocation and
renewability are present, as described in the security model. A pending danger is the single master
key. Anybody who can get hold of it is able to decrypt all content from that Packager.
3.1.7 Flexibility evaluation
WMDRM only oers support for video and audio which can be oered as les, streaming, live
streaming. The rich content requirement is thus not fullled. As explained in "Licenses and
rights expressions", WMDRM oers exible usage rules. The consumption of protected content
is limited to the computer on which the license was downloaded, or one of the connected devices.
Streaming within the home network is also possible, yet WMDRM does not support ubiquitous
consumption. A disadvantage is the strong dependency on Microsoft Windows platforms and the
lack of a directly deployable DRM system. WMDRM oers an API to the individual components,
enabling developers to set up customized DRM systems in a exible way. A Publisher Tool and a
Producer Tool can be implemented.
Super-distribution is no problem in WMDRM, due to the absence of personalized protected
content using watermarks. At the client side, backup of licenses can be made just as common
data. Because the protected content is not personalized, this enables client-side recovery. It is
also possible to implement the storage of licenses at server side. However, WMDRM does not
oer explicit support for this. In case of a hardware failure, support can be oered to restore the
licenses on another computer. WMDRM does not oer a Payment Service, but external payment
services are available that can be used and integrated in WMDRM system. Rights gifts are absent
but can be implemented as certicates.
3.2 FairPlay
3.2.1 Context
FairPlay is a DRM technology developed by Apple, but the company does not provide any infor-
mation about the inner working of its DRM technology, making it dicult to discuss it thoroughly.
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FairPlay is a fairly simple DRM technology and is used in the QuickTime multimedia tech-
nology and in the iTunes [26] application, which is intended to play, organize and buy music les.
iTunes is used in the popular iPod music playing device. The only supported content type is
audio, using protected AAC audio les. The actual decoding is performed by Apple's QuickTime,
which encapsulates the DRM client of the consumer. In fact, every QuickTime player is capable
of processing FairPlay encoded les, including RealPlayer and Media Player Classic.
FairPlay is considered a less restrictive DRM implementation, since it allows songs to be copied
to any number of iPod devices and played on up to ve authorized computers. In addition, tracks
may be burned on a CD (which removes the DRM protection) and play lists may be burned on a
CD up to seven times. Archiving to DVD is also provided.
3.2.2 Architecture
No information publicly available.
3.2.3 Security model
Most information about the security model has been leaked due to a successful attack.
The content is an encrypted AAC audio stream, packed within an MPEG-4 container. The
encryption uses an AES symmetric key in combination with MD5 hashing for integrity. This
symmetric key is called the master key and is stored on the server. When a user buys a song, for
instance, the server generates a random user key that is used to encrypt the master key, which is
then combined with the encrypted content into an MPEG-4 container which is sent to the user.
Together with a content identier, the user key is added to the account information on the server.
This key is also sent to the user's device, where the iTunes application puts it into a key repository.
Using the key repository iTunes is able to retrieve the master key. Using the master key, iTunes
is able to decrypt the AAC audio stream and play it.
It is still unsure whether FairPlay, before the content is encrypted with the master key, embeds
a watermark in the content containing the identity of the user. If the rumor is true, a Verance
[42] watermark is used.
When a new computer is authorized, iTunes sends a unique machine identier to the server,
which in turn sends all the user key - content identier pairs belonging to that user to the iTunes
application. This ensures that a user can play all acquired iTunes songs on the newly registered
computer, and that the maximum number of computers allowed to play content does not exceed
the limit of ve posed by apple.
When deauthorizing a computer, iTunes instructs the server to remove the unique machine
identier, and at the same time, it removes all the user keys from its encrypted key repository.
When a track is copied to an iPod device, iTunes also copies the user key, enabling the iPod
to play the track. There is no limit on the number of iPods allowed to play content.
3.2.4 Attacks
After the launch of iTunes Music Store, dierent people made eorts to circumvent or even remove
the DRM protection.
Jon Johansen, also known as author of the DeCSS program which removes the DVD protection,
reverse-engineered the encryption technique in FairPlay and created an algorithm which is able to
remove DRM protection without re-encoding. The rst open-source application that was released
was called called QTFairUse and was also written by Johansen. It intercepts the decrypted
output and writes it to a le. This functionality has been integrated into the VLC media player
[43]. Another software package called PlayFair does the same. Its successor is called Hymn [21].
Johansen also released his own tool, called Fairkeys [27].
There are a number of tools enabling the owner of FairPlay protected content to remove
protection, even without loosing quality. These tools require, however, the user key, either from
the server or the local iTunes or iPod key repository. Secondly, the watermark, if present, is left
intact, which enables to identify who originally bought the le.
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More recently (March 2005) a new tool, called PyMusique, appeared, which enables one to
buy songs from iTunes, but instead of storing the protected audio, it rst decrypts the audio. By
consequence, the tool makes iTunes behave like a paid MP3 download site.
3.2.5 Security evaluation
By copying content to a CD, the prevention mechanism of FairPlay can be removed and so is any
control on the consumption and distribution of rights. Depending on the presence of a watermark
in the content, which is unclear today, fraud detection is possible.
The permanent protection requirement is not met due to the attack described above and the
possibility to copy content to CD. Because no separate rights in the form of licenses are used,
the tight coupling of rights, user and content and tamper resistance of consumption requirements
cannot be supported. Revocation and renewability are likely not to be present.
Clearly, Apple uses the security-through-obscurity principle, which clearly has been proven not
powerful enough to prevent successful attacks against it.
3.2.6 Flexibility evaluation
At the moment, FairPlay only supports music les. Thus, FairPlay oers no rich content. The
usage rules are hard coded into the application. By consequence, FairPlay oers xed instead
of exible usage rules. Five computers and unlimited number of iPod devices can be enabled to
consume the content, but consumers cannot consume their content everywhere. The ubiquitous
consumption requirement is thus not fullled. There is no API oered. FairPlay can only be
used by players based on Apple technology. In July 2004, RealNetworks introduced the Harmony
technology [18], which enables playing protected RealPlayer les on iPods. RealPlayer uses another
DRM technology, called Helix DRM (see Section 3.7.3). Harmony transparently converts protected
RealPlayer les to FairPlay-compatible protected les. iTunes is available on MAC and Windows
platforms that run iTunes. It is not possible for a party to submit its own content to the system.
There is thus neither a Producer Tool, nor a Publisher Tool. One reason of the success of FairPlay
is probably its ease of use.
Super-distribution is not supported. It is possible to oer someone a rights gift : FairPlay calls
it a gift certicate, which is in essence a digital pre-paid card, enabling one to download music
until there is no more money left on the card. Payment is easy done using a pre-pay model:
users can charge their account with an amount of money enabling them to download music les.
Because the server stores the key-content identier pairs, it is possible to oer recoverability.
It is a fairly simple system in the sense that it does not use licenses in which the usage and
distribution rules can be set. These rules seem to be hard-coded.
3.3 Adobe PDF Merchant / Web Buy
3.3.1 Context
Adobe oers DRM protection for documents in PDF which is a popular digital document format
that is open, publicly available, application and platform independent, and it allows to be printed
exactly as shown on-screen. The DRM technology is described in [1] and consists of two entities:
Adobe PDF Merchant and Adobe Web Buy. The rst is the server application, the second the
plug-in in acrobat reader, the PDF viewer at the client side.
Adobe PDF Merchant is a server-based technology designed to be integrated into existing e-
commerce and transaction servers. It manages encryption of PDF les and the distribution of keys
to access them. To provide consumers with a mechanism for purchasing and viewing electronic
content produced using Adobe PDF Merchant, Adobe has implemented Web Buy, which is a
standard plug-in in the free Acrobat Reader.
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Figure 8: Possible architecture using Web Buy as DRM client and PDF Merchant as DRM system
3.3.2 Architecture
The functionality oered by PDF Merchant can be decomposed in multiple components. PDF
Merchant does not have its own authentication or payment capabilities but can be integrated in
other e-commerce applications that have their own authentication and payment handling. Also
distribution is not a part of PDF Merchant; super-distribution (but also the distribution of unique
copies) is possible using any possible medium or network.
Figure 8 illustrates one possible setup, where the functionality of PDF Merchant is spread over
a License Service and a Packaging Service. Because authentication and payment are no parts of
PDF Merchant functionality, we do not take them into account.
Web Buy. Web Buy corresponds to the DRM client of the consumer. When a consumer
wants a license corresponding to some content, Web Buy contacts the license server, using the
content-unique URL in the PDF le. To get a license (voucher) Web Buy provides the necessary
identication information to the license server and accomplishes the payment.
Producer Client. The producer just has to submit its content and potentially corre-
sponding rules to the Packaging Service. Contracts are not explicitly supported. No separate
Producer Client is available but existing tools can be used to generate PDF documents. Some
optimization of the document may be done, such as compression of the inserted images.
Packaging Service. This service, the Publisher in Web Merchant terminology, receives
content from the content owner, and generates a content-unique key which is used to encrypt
(lock) the content. The key is sent to the License Service. A unique URL is added to the
le, pointing back to a website where the consumer can buy a license (called voucher). The
Packaging Service also decides what identication data is required to allow users to access content.
Content Distributor. The encrypted content can be distributed in any possible way.
An external Content Distributor can be used. Because the encryption is generally content (and
not copy) dependent, super-distribution becomes possible.
License Service. This service creates licenses using the content-unique key and some
identication data from the user side, such as CPU ID, removable disk ID, xed disk ID, user
name or e-mail. Each ID is put into the license together with an associated key, which allows the
Web Buy plug-in at the user side to reconstruct the content-unique key.
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3.3.3 Security Model
A license is an XML le that is signed with a 1024 bit key corresponding to a X.509 certicate
and encrypted using 56-bit RSA encryption technology.
Because it is not possible to embed an imperceptible watermark into text, watermarking content
with the buyer's id is not possible. It is, however, possible to show a visible watermark when the
document is displayed or printed. The watermark can show variables such as transaction data
and ID, user name, or the domain where it is consumable. This enables fraud detection by screen
capturing or print rescanning. The watermark information is located in the license, not in the
content. Typically, the Packaging Service will dene whether a watermark must be present. Adobe
expects more and more devices and computers to be equipped with a tamper-resistant clock, which
is necessary to allow time dependent consumption rights.
3.3.4 Licenses and right expression
As pointed before, a license (voucher) consists of identication data (e.g. CPU ID) which compose
the binding rules and can be combined by AND and OR connectives. Also, a UTC (Coordinated
Universal Time) with corresponding key data can be added which allows to dene time-related
usage rules. There are no distribution rules in the current version. The usage rules involve printing,
viewing, changing the document, selecting text and graphics, and adding or changing annotations
and form elds. Their associated conditions are rather limited. Not only the licenses contain rules,
but also the content itself. Rights granted by a license are only valid if they are also present in
the content.
3.3.5 Attacks
A Russian cryptographer, Dmitry Sklyarov, has published in 2001 a tool that is able to remove
Adobes protection on PDF les. He has been arrested by the FBI for violating the DMCA (The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act). After his release, his employer has been accused. More
information about the attack can be found on [8]. Now, some tools on the Internet allow easily
removing DRM protection when a valid corresponding license is available.
3.3.6 Security Evaluation
Web Buy/PDF Merchant is a fairly simple DRM technology that was broken a few years ago.
The control on distribution and control on the consumption were broken. It is impossible to
integrate in a text document a watermark that cannot be removed. However, a visible watermark
protection exists to detect screen grabs or print-rescans, but this will be of no help against the
attack described above. By consequence, there is only very limited fraud detection possible. Due
to the attack described above, permanent protection is no longer the case. The attack also broke
the coupling between the content and the license. The coupling of license and consumer is in
fact a coupling with one ore more devices of the consumer. There is no support for revocation or
renewability. The licenses are made tamper-resistant by using digital signatures.
3.3.7 Flexibility Evaluation
Adobe focuses only on PDF documents and not on rich content. There are no distribution rules,
and also the conditions are rather limited. We thus have not so exible usage rules. One or more
devices are able to consume content. Extra restrictions on e-mail or user names used are possible,
but due to security reasons, these will probably not be used without device binding. By binding
content to a removable disk, the content can be consumed on any device. We thus have a very
limited form of ubiquitous computing. No API is available. Adobe focuses on Macintosh and
Windows platforms. There are no Linux/Unix implementations. Advantages are that the format
is open, widely accepted, cross-platform. Web Buy is, as feature within other applications, very
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user friendly. PDF-merchant can be used as Producer Tool. Their is no real publisher functionality
present (except maybe limited congurability, which can be done using the PDF Merchant).
Both super-distribution and unique copies are possible. Rights gifts are not possible. Rights
recovery can be provided by the retailer and payments are done using an external Payment Service.
There is little or no support for fair-use.
3.4 LWDRM
3.4.1 Context
The usual DRM schemes are strong in the sense that they enforce the usage rules at the consumer
side very strictly (e.g. a consumer can play a song only ten times or only on three devices).
According to Fraunhofer institute [16] this is an important reason why DRM is currently not
very well accepted by the market. To overcome this problem, they developed Light Weight DRM
(LWDRM) [28] which allows consumers to do everything they want with the content they bought,
except for large scale distribution. LWDRM is an application of the fair-use principle.
LWDRM uses two le formats: the Local Media File (LMF) format and the Signed Media File
(SMF) format. An LMF le is bound to a single device by a hardware-driven key but can be
converted to the SMF-format which can be played on whatever device that supports LWDRM.
However, the identity of the legitimate owner is embedded in the content. If such a le is found
mass distributed, the source of abuse can be retrieved and prosecution can follow. Based on
personalization instead of copy protection, LWDRM tries to balance between good protection and
user-friendliness. Because rights are not made explicitly, no licenses are needed.
Although development of LWDRM has stopped since 2004, the concepts and services oered
are highly relevant when comparing DRM technologies.
3.4.2 Architecture
The architecture of LWDRM consists of ve main components which are shown in Figure 9: the
Client Tool, the Accounting Service, the Content Packer, the Payment Service, and a Certication
Authority.
Client Tool. The Client Tool is a consumer side application with the DRM client encap-
sulated. It is used by the consumer to register and to search, obtain and play content. The
only component interface that is queried by the Client Tool is the Accounting Service interface.
For being able to download protected content, the Client Tool has to do the correct payment
using the Payment Service. If the consumer has not yet registered the device or computer to
the DRM system, the Client Tool has to provide its device specic public key rst, together
with a prove of identity using signatures and digital certicates. Once the Client Tool has re-
ceived the LMF content, the consumer is able to generate a corresponding SMF locally afterwards.
Accounting Service. The interface of this service is queried by the Client Tool to com-
municate with the online DRM system. The Accounting Service administers relevant information
about the available content, such as price, meta data and ownership, and stores the user accounts
together with all associated transactions and purchases. The content itself can be stored in a
database on the DRM system. The Client Tool can search for content using the Accounting
Service interface. Upon receival of a request for content from a Client Tool, the Accounting
Service asks the external Payment Service a payment conrmation. If registration has not yet
been fullled, the Accounting Service asks the Client Tool to provide a signed device specic
system key together with a certicate. By contacting the Certicate Authority the certicate is
validated. When the Accounting Service is convinced of both the consumer's identity and the
fulllment of the payment, it sends to the Content Packer a request containing the device specic
public key, transaction number and content identier.
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Figure 9: LWDRM architecture
The Content Packer. This component generates a new LMF le when it receives a re-
quest from the Accounting Service, and sends the LMF le, together with a receipt, directly to
the Client Tool.
Payment Service. This service oers public interfaces to do and check payments.
Certication Authority. This is an external trusted third party which issues and vali-
dates certicates.
Currently no support is oered by Fraunhofer to add new content to the DRM system by
dierent producers.
3.4.3 Security model
We will now explain in detail how both LMF and SMF are generated. We rst explain LMF
generation. When the Content Packer gets a request, it gets the device specic public key, the
transaction number and (an identier of) the content to protect. It also knows the provider
ID. First of all, a strong watermark, consisting of a provider id and a unique transaction id, is
embedded in the unprotected content. Secondly, a new, randomly generated (symmetrical) 128-bit
AES session-key is used to encrypt the watermarked content. Then, the session key is encrypted
using the (asymmetrical) device specic public RSA key. The resulting LMF le contains an
asymmetrical encrypted session key and the watermarked content encrypted with the session-key.
The LMF can only be decrypted if the system specic private key is known. The corresponding
private key can only be derived by a single target device, using its hardware specic parameters.
In case of mass abuse, the source of abuse can be determined using the transaction and provider
id embedded in the content.
Next to an LMF le, the consumer receives a receipt signed by the DRM system with the
private key of the provider who is using the DRM system. It serves as a proof of purchase for the
user, containing information about the transaction, a content id, user id and provider id. If the
rights holder is willing to grant the permission, it can also carry information about whether the
content may be shared with others ("free" vs. "private").
To enable content consumption on multiple devices, consumers can export an LMF le to SMF
format. The session-key contained in the LMF le must rst be decrypted using the device specic
private key. Then, the session key is encrypted with the private key corresponding to the users
certicate. In this way, the binding of the content with a device is replaced by a binding with the
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user. The SMF will contain the encrypted media-le, the encrypted session key, the certicate of
the user, which is needed to decrypt the content, and a receipt signed by the content provider.
The SMF contains all necessary information to play the le and it allows to verify the identity of
the consumer who originally bought the song.
SMF content can be converted to LMF format, but such an LMF le cannot be converted back
into SMF. In this way, content can be given to friends, but they are unable to distribute it further.
It is also possible for consumers to convert unprotected content to LMF.
Although not mentioned in the ocial documentation released by Fraunhofer, it is likely that
LMF and SMF are integrity protected by a signature placed by the content provider.
LWDRM has a serious privacy problem: an SMF container not only contains the certicate of
the user, but also a signed receipt, containing information of where and when the song is bought.
This can be solved by using the separation of duty principle as shown in [59]: one entity issues
pseudonym certicates to users who can prove their own identity (typically by using a certicate).
This pseudonym certicate is then used to buy content. When large scale abuse is detected, the
pseudonym issuer can reveal the real identity to the police.
3.4.4 Security evaluation
Because the fair-use principle is used, controlled consumption and controlled distribution are not
possible. If the watermarking schemes are strong enough, fraud detection is possible. LWDRM
has never been seriously tested. So, the robustness of the watermarking schemes is still unknown.
Due to the fair-use principle, no rights are made explicit, and thus the tamper-resistant usage
rules requirements can be omitted. In the tight coupling between content, license and consumer
requirement, only the content-consumer binding is relevant and is fullled by embedding a wa-
termark into the content. The trustworthiness of the DRM clients has not yet been tested. How
good the permanent protection requirement is fullled, is also not yet clear. As far as we know,
no information has been published on revocation or renewability.
3.4.5 Flexibility evaluation
LWDRM supports MPEG-4 audio and video. When using ISMA (Internet Streaming Media
Alliance), not only les can be protected using LWDRM, but also media streams. It is possible to
apply the same principle to images, if robust watermarking schemes are used. The rich content
requirement is thus not fullled. The device bound LMF content can be converted to the device
independent SMF content. Ubiquitous consumption is thus possible if you have access to the SMF
content. When ordering content, the consumer gets a receipt, which can be used to prove its rights
on the content after a system crash. At the content provider side, the Accounting Service keeps
track of the transactions and purchases of each separate consumer. This can be used to recover
the consumer's content. Disadvantages are the absence of a publicly available API (the default
LWDRM application must be used) and the absence of the content producer side functionality.
Nothing is mentioned about a Publisher Tool or Producer Tool. For being able to fetch protected
content, a personal certicate is required. This is a drawback for user-friendliness.
Due to the application of watermarking, super-distribution is not possible. Due to the use of
a private key associated with a personal certicate for obtaining content, it is not possible to give
someone else content in a normal LMF. It is however possible to convert SMF content back to
restricted LMF content. Rights gifts are thus only possible in a limited way. Payment functionality
is integrated as pay-per-download in the default application. Some other exploitation models such
as pay-per-consume and subscription are not possible in this scheme. The fair-use principle is
used. The source of large scale abuse is still easily traceable. Because of this principle, it is not
needed to explicitly formulate the usage rules and to use a REL. By consequence, the requirements
on exible usage rules do not apply here.
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Figure 10: EMMS architecture
3.5 EMMS
3.5.1 Context
IBM's Electronic Media Management System (EMMS) [22] oers DRM protection for video, music,
documents, rich media and software, independent of the format used. Streaming is supported.
EMMS uses secure container technology to oer tamper resistant containers of data. EMMS
plug-ins are available for RealJukeBox (RealNetworks) and MusicMatch JukeBox (MusicMatch)
by downloading plug-in. Both MusicMatch and RealNetworks still support their own competing
DRM technologies. They also support Intertrust technologies and WMDRM.
Recently (June 2005), IBM announced the withdrawal of EMMS from the market without
releasing a replacement product. Nevertheless it is still interesting to map its high level components
to the generic service components identied in Section 2.
3.5.2 Architecture
The whole architecture shown in Figure 10 consists of seven components which could be bought
separate or in group. We will describe them and show how this ts in our general architecture.
Web Commerce Enabler. This service corresponds to the Retailer in the generic ar-
chitecture. This component facilitates and supports the integration of EMMS DRM into web
applications and enables consumers to nd and obtain content and corresponding licenses.
Transaction information of digital content is gathered and sent to the Clearinghouse. The Web
Commerce Enabler allows a myriad of business models: subscription, geographically constrained,
wholesale, time based, pay-per-use, promotions, etc. Also promotional data can be sent by the
content producer to the Web Commerce Enabler.
EMMS Client Software Development Kit. This service corresponds to the DRM
client and oers an API enabling development of consumer applications. It enables to browse, buy
and download content and licenses on Web Commerce Enabler servers. It also oers an interface to
a tamper resistant library for managing the DRM protected content. The Secure Access Manager,
which is part of this SDK, facilitates control over transfer of content, meta data and usage condi-
tions to external devices (e.g. CD-ROMs) in formats specic to the receiving device or application.
Multi-Device Server. This server oers support to transmit digital content to wireless
devices and to implement on-demand production of CD's or portable medCd'sn accordance with
the license. The content can be repacked in order to meet the requirements of the target device.
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Content Preparation Development SDK. This corresponds to the Producer Client in-
terface combined with the Import Service in the general architecture and enables the development
of applications specic to the content industry. It is used by content owners and distributors.
Content can be protected (i.e. put in a secure container), a corresponding contract can be made
and meta data can be specied. The protected content can be distributed using any means,
but is usually sent to a server running the Content Hosting Program. The corresponding key
data is sent to the Clearinghouse via the Web Commerce Enabler. Extra promotional data
can be provided to the Web Commerce Enabler. The EMMS Enabler for PDF is an addition
to the Content Preparation Development SDK needed to package and disperse protected PDF
documents. Instead of using an SDK, a full program called the EMMS Content Mastering
Program can be used. This program however only supports the packaging of audio content.
EMMS Hosting Program. The task of the EMMS Hosting Program is pure distribu-
tion and sending statistical info about the distribution to the Clearinghouse. The functionality of
the program corresponds to the Content Service in the general architecture and oers extensive
support for hosting. This component receives protected content from the Producer Client (who
uses the Content Preparation Development SDK). Multiple collaborating hosts can be set,
allowing content replication, hierarchical topologies, caching of hosts, spreading of workload and
geographical distribution. All distribution activity is tracked and sent to the Clearinghouse. The
protection of the content was already done by the producer using the Content Preparation API.
Clearinghouse. This is the central control point that corresponds to the License Service,
the Tracking Service and the Access Service in the general architecture. It receives its tracking
data from the Web Commerce Enabler and the Content Hosting programs and can generate
license transaction tracking data itself and is thus able to generate extended reports. It receives
key data and contracts from the Web Commerce Enabler, which thus enables the Clearinghouse
to issue licenses. Finally, authorization of transactions is done here. Therefore, contacting an
external Payment Service may be needed.
3.5.3 Licenses and rights exibility
Licenses are dened using ODRL, which oers an extensive and exible way to dene rules in the
licenses. Region bound usage rules can be set, the number of times a dened action is possible on
the content, the time interval in which it is consumable, the time a copy can exist. The possibility
to share content is also present.
3.5.4 Security model
No relevant information publicly available.
3.5.5 Security evaluation
Controlled distribution of rights and controlled consumption are possible. There is no watermark
present in the protected content and thus no fraud detection. Nothing is known about the reliability
and robustness of the solution, except that no successful attacks are published. At the moment of
writing.
3.5.6 Flexibility evaluation
A wide range of Common media formats such as MP3 are supported. EMMS is codec independent
and covers most of the usual applications associated with multimedia content, such as eBooks,
music or videos. It is not clear if combinations of these are supported and if they can be described
separately. The rich content requirement can thus be fullled. The exibility of the usage rules
in EMMS is good. It is unclear to what level ubiquitous consumption is possible. Many business
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models are possible. It is reasonable to state that fair-use is hard to achieve when using EMMS.
The SDK allows the integration of EMMS into each player, but these APIs are not publicly
available. The dierent components have to be bought. A cryptographic co-processor is needed for
being able to run the EMMS Clearinghouse program and most components run only on Windows
NT or Windows 2000 platforms (except the EMMS Web Commerce Enabler , which runs on
Windows NT/2000, AIX, Sun Solaris, Hp-UX and DEC UNIX). Most components also need a
DB2 database. Using the SDKs, Publisher Tools and Producer Tools can be developed. The
protection is content specic and not copy-specic, which enables super-distribution. However,
this introduces a risk since watermarks are not possible in combination with super-distribution.
No information is found about rights gifts, recoverability, or ease of use.
3.6 OMA specication
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA [34]) is a forum formed in June 2002 which tries to oer a
comprehensive open specication to enable interoperability between service providers and mo-
bile devices. OMA allows companies to implement dierent versions of the specication, while
maintaining interoperability.
OMA focuses on DRM for mobile devices, i.e. protection of ringtones, backgrounds, screen-
savers, etc. In June 2004, OMA released the DRM Approval Enabler which includes three types
of functionality: Forward Lock, Combined Delivery and Separate Delivery [61]. Forward Lock
imeans that content meanskaged into a special container format, called a DRM message. The
content is not encrypted, but the DRM message and the included media object may not leave the
receiving device after reception. It may be stored on the device and consumed without restrictions,
but strictly on that device. Forward Lock is typically applied to low value content. This type
of protection can be used, for instance, by subscription-based services that send news to mobile
devices.
The second type of protection, Combined Delivery, extends the concept of Forward Lock by
giving the possibility to dene more ne-grained rights and permissions than the simple forward-
lock restriction. As in Forward Lock, the content is packaged into a special container format, the
DRM message. However, in Combined Delivery a rights section is included in the DRM message,
in addition to the media section containing the content. The rights section contains rights and
permissions relating to the media object and specied using the OMA rights expressions language.
The third type, Separate Delivery, is a logical extension of Combined Delivery. As in Combined
Delivery, it is possible to specify rights for media objects. However, rights and media objects are
now transported separately in two objects, compared to the combined delivery where content and
rights are transported in the same object. The media object is always encrypted and converted
into the DRM content format (DCF). The device may forward (super-distribute) the protected
DCF le to another device. However, rights objects are not allowed to be forwarded, i.e. the
receiving device must acquire rights for the media object from the issuing server.
In December 2004, v2.0 Candidate Enabler was published. This enabler should counter the
shortcomings of the v1.0 Approval Enabler and builds upon Separate Delivery. This section will
discuss the V2.0 Candidate Enabler.
Beep Science [3] and DMDsecure (see Section 3.7.2) already provided an OMA v1.0 DRM
implementations. CoreMedia [7] has a deal with Vodafone to make an implementation compliant
with both OMA v1.0 and OMA v.2.0. SanDisk [36] announced on 14 march 2005 that it will
produce OMA DRM compliant storage. Nokia and Microsoft announced in februari 2005 to
buiFebruarydge between Windows Media DRM and OMA DRM.
3.6.1 Architecture
The architecture of OMA is shown in Figure 11. At the server side, we identify a Content Issuer
and a Rights Issuer which correspond to the Content Service and the License Service in the
generic architecture. The DRM Agent (i .e. the DRM client) receives protected content via super-
distribution from another DRM Agent or can search protected content on, and download it from
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Figure 11: OMA architecture
a Content Issuer.
For being able to preview or consume content, the DRM Agent contacts the Rights Issuer to
obtain a Rights Object (i.e. a license). Lost or damaged Rights Object can be restored via the
Rights Issuer. A DRM Agent can also request the Rights Issuer to join or leave a domain which is
a set of DRM Agents able to use the same Domain Rights Objects. A domain could, for example,
be the set of devices owned by a specic user. Not all devices in a domain need access to the
network for being able to consume content. Communication with another device in the domain
on which the content and Rights Objects reside is enough. This is called Unconnected Device
Support.
Before DRM Agents are able to download a Rights Object, they have to complete a registration
procedure with the Rights Issuer. The DRM Agent is obliged to prove ownership of a certicate
which is checked by the Rights Issuer for validity by contacting an external Certication Authority.
Content can be pulled by the DRM agent from the Content issuer, but it can also be pushed
to the DRM Agent by the Content Issuer. This can be done for subscription based services where
the DRM Agent receives for example the daily news items. A last possibility is push-initiated pull:
a link to the protected content is sent by the Content Issuer to the DRM agent. How content can
be added to the DRM system by content consumers is not specied in the OMA DRM Enablers.
Components such as the Import Service or interactions with these components are not dened by
OMA.
3.6.2 Security Model
Content is packaged in a DRM Content Format (DCF) secure container. It is encrypted using
a symmetric Content Encryption Key (CEK) and signed by the Content Issuer. The key is
content specic, which poses a security risk: if a device is compromised, its CEKs can be exposed.
Therefore, it is recommended by OMA not to use the same CEK for all content instances. Pre-
packaging by the Content Issuer using a CEK is easy. No watermarking is used to protect content.
The CEKs are sent to the Rights Issuer. This enables the Rights Issuer to create Rights Objects
on request. A Rights Object contains, next to a set of usage rules, the CEK of the corresponding
protected content. The CEK and other sensitive data is encrypted with a public key specic for
a DRM agent, enabling the DRM Agent to consume the content. The Rights Objects are signed
by the Content Issuer.
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The DRM Agent has its own, unique key pair with an associated certicate, which is needed for
authentication to the Rights Issuer. When a type of DRM agents is compromised, all certicates
of that type of agent can be revoked. A DRM Agent Certicate also enables Rights Issuers to
decide whether to trust a DRM Agent. A DRM Agent needs a secure clock for time based rules.
The Content Issuer has a certicate to authenticate itself to the DRM Agent. All DRM Agents
in a domain have a Domain Key, which enables them to access all content within that domain.
The OMA DRM protection is independent of the type of content, and supports both delivery
as a le or as a stream. The DCF container has some unencrypted elds where the URI can be
found to fetch a Rights Objects. A DCF container can be stored o-device, typically as backup.
3.6.3 Licenses
A license is called a Rights Object in OMA context. A Rights Object is bound to a specic DRM
Agent on a specic device, Rights Objects can also be bound to a group of DRM Agents, called
a domain.
An important property is the possibility to assign dierent usage rules to dierent parts in a
composite content object or one license to dierent pieces of content. Rights Objects can be copied
and stored as backup if they are stateless. For example, when the number of plays is limited, a
backup of the Rights Object is impossible.
Allowed conversions to other DRM Systems can be specied.
The Rights Expression Language used is OMA REL. This is an extension of ODRL.
3.6.4 Security evaluation
Revocation is provided in the specication. The other security aspects are implementation depen-
dent, so no conclusions can be drawn concerning security characteristics of OMA.
3.6.5 Flexibility evaluation
Rich content with dierent rights for the subparts are possible. XrML is used as REL, which makes
the exibility of the usage rules very high. Domains of devices can be specied which allows a
limited form of ubiquitous computing. Because this is an open specication, the API is evidently
available. The specication is platform independent. Super-distribution and recoverability are
covered. The payment methods do not belong to the OMA DRM part. Fair-use is not allowed.
Nothing is said about rights gifts.
3.7 Other proprietary technologies
In this section we discuss ve proprietary DRM technologies or DRM related companies, but not
as extended as the previous six, since less relevant information is publicly available. We discuss
Intertrust, Helix DRM, AegisDRM, DMDsecure and SealedMedia.
3.7.1 Intertrust
Intertrust [24] is a company which is founded in 1990 and specializes in DRM. Although it does
not oer a complete DRM system, it is one of the most important actors in the eld. It has an
extended patent portfolio on intellectual property for DRM, Digital Policy Management (DPM),
and trusted computing. It currently holds 31 U.S. patents, 12 international patents and over
100 patent applications. The company has license agreements with over 40 companies, among
which Adobe, Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, Universal Music and BMG. In November 2002, the
company was taken over by Sony and Philips. In April 2004, Intertrust and Microsoft reached a
settlement in a lawsuit initiated by Intertrust in April 2001 due to patent infringement. In April
2005, Intertrust prevailed in a patent dispute with Macrovision. Intertrust is member of the Coral
Consortium and its successor, Marlin Joint Development Association (Marlin JDA, see Section
4.2).
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The patents of Intertrust cover a wide variety of dierent aspects, among which the most
important ones are summarized below.
 Management of web services: Protection and management of digital applications and
content wherever they travel, reside or are used.
 Executable software integrity: Authentication of software components to the operating
system based on integrity and reliability rules.
 Credentials/driver signing: Authentication of executables to the operating system based
on integrity and proper behavior.
 Supply chain management through independent delivery of rules: Enabling to
dene and enforce usage rules or policies related to digital content.
 Managing media content or enterprise information: Enabling entities to dene and
enforce usage rules, independent of the location where the content or information resides or
travels.
 Enterprise-to-enterprise transactions: Automation of enterprise transaction according
to enterprise policies. Possible transactions are authorizing, purchasing, auditing, reporting,
and clearing of supplies and inventory.
 Compliance: Secured and automated tracking of transactions and usage based on enterprise
policies and regulatory requirements.
 Portability of rules: Allowing to loan or move content between consumers or devices.
 Nested policies within a single item: Allows the association of multiple sets to dierent
parts in the content.
 Silicon protective measures: Technologies for hardware security as an integrated com-
ponent of a distributed trusted computing network.
3.7.2 DMDSecure
DMDsecure [12] is a company (recently taken over by SafeNet) that oers a range of DRM-related
products: DMDlicenser, DMDmobile, DMDfusion, OMA DRM Server Toolkit and Multiple DRM
Server Toolkit. DMDsecure focuses on online DRM clients.
 DMDlicenser [10] corresponds to the online DRM system in the generic architecture. It
uses WMDRM 9 & 10 functionality (see Section 3.1) and provides all the DRM features
provided by Microsoft. DMDsecure guarantees interoperability between WMDRM clients.
A usage prole engine allows one to dynamically manage rights on content. A customer
information engine allows the use of virtual user domains and usage metering. A virtual
user domain manages the consumption of content on multiple devices. Usage metering does
not need a permanent back-channel. The condition pipeline allows for integration with
external authentication, subscriber management, and billing systems, while it also enforces
contractual obligations such as limits on license volumes, or time-based constraints on license
deliveries. DMDlicenser uses open and standardized APIs which enable easy integration
into existing infrastructures. The corresponding Producer Tool that is oered is called the
DMDpackager. Content can be distributed over any IP-based network.
 DMDmobile [11] is a server solution that implements the OMA DRM specication. DMD-
mobile consists of two basic components: a Protection Component and a License Component.
The Protection Component corresponds to the Import Service in the generic architecture
and protects content according to the OMA specications. A web-based GUI is provided for
content producers. The License Component corresponds to the combination of the Producer
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Tool and the Import Service in the generic architecture. It allows content producers to com-
pose sets of usage rules and to apply them to content. The issuance of licenses itself is done
by a third party. Notice that DMDmobile does not oer a DRM-client implementation. In
the spirit of OMA, DMDmobile is an open and pluggable architecture designed to be secure
and extensible. It supports a wide variety of exploitation models.
 OMA DRM Server Toolkit [13] provides an API to core DRM operations as dened in
OMADRM as well as DRM features that are independent of the underlying DRM technology.
Documentation and sample code is included in the toolkit. The core operations support
content protection, rights management, license generation, and license delivery. The toolkit
can be deployed in any Java environment.
 DMDfusion 5 [9] is an interoperable DRM server solution. Currently, it implements and
extends WMDRM and OMA DRM. The DMDfusion API is designed to integrate with ex-
isting encoding, content management, content delivery, subscriber management and billing
infrastructures. It oers DRM agnostic functionality. Just as the DMDlicenser, a customer
information engine, a conditions pipeline and a usage prole engine is present as extension
to the basic functionality. The corresponding Producer Tool that is oered as part of DMD-
fusion is called the DMDpackager. Also a DMDmeter is present which corresponds to the
Tracking Service in the generic architecture. Content can be distributed over any IP-based
network.
 Multiple DRM Server Toolkit [13] provides an API to developers such that they can
use all functionality required to include support for WMDRM and OMA DRM. The API
is DRM technology agnostic. The same interface can be used for generating content and
licenses of both OMA and WMDRM. The toolkit can be deployed in any Java or .NET
environment, and it provides core implementations, documentation and sample code. To
realize this abstraction of DRM technologies, a layered architecture is proposed, consisting
of four layers: the Data Abstraction Layer, the Technology abstraction Layer, the Conditions
Abstraction Layer and the Service Abstraction Layer which is optional.
3.7.3 Helix DRM
Helix DRM [20] was announced on January 9, 2003 by RealNetworks. It is designed to be in-
tegrated in existing e-commerce applications. Multiple business models can be applied such as
subscription, pay-per-consume and promotions.
Helix DRM focuses on a wide variety of video and audio formats. It supports, for instance,
RealAudio, RealVideo, AAC, MP3 and MPEG-4. Streaming, downloading and other delivery
methods are possible (using super-distribution). Both the client plug-in and the DRM system
itself can be installed on dierent platforms such as Win32, Sun Solaris, Linux 2.2, HP-UX and
AIX.
The promote Helix DRM, RealNetworks released part of the source code [19]. The more
'sensitive' parts are not released by RealNetworks.
Helix DRM consists of four key components:
 Helix DRM Packager uses encryption and secure container technology to protect con-
tent. Watermarks are not mentioned. Streaming, live streaming, downloading and super-
distribution are possible.
 Helix DRM License Server plays the role of the License Service, the Tracking Service
and the Access Service. It veries license requests and issues licenses, provides auditing
information to facilitate royalty payments, and it allows to manage, authorize, and report
content transactions.
 Helix DRM Client is the consumer's DRM client and allows streaming and playback of
content and oers a tamper resistant environment to consume content according to the usage
rules specied in the license.
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 Helix DRM for Devices enables device manufacturers to equip their devices with Helix
DRM support. Two integration models are currently oered: Secure Memory Device and
Secure Streaming Device. These models allow manufacturers to deliver content to devices
via a home-network or to interact directly with DRM services.
Helix DRM distinguishes between content and usage rules by using licenses. Multiple license
types are possible on the same content. Usage rules can limit the times a piece of content can
be consumed, the time-frame in which consumption is possible, and the duration content can be
consumed (e.g. only the rst minute). Revocation of licenses is possible. There are no distribution
rules.
3.7.4 AegisDRM
AegisDRM [2] is a DRM technology that focuses on intra-company content distribution. The four
main components that are oered are the Protector, the Protector add-in Module (PaM), the
RightsServer, and the LicenseMaster.
 ProtectorTM corresponds to the Producer Tool combined with a producer-side Packager.
It allows content producers to specify various usage rules (e.g. for screen-grabbing, printing,
copying, cutting-and-pasting, forwarding and saving). It oers a myriad of content le
types that can be protected, such as HTML pages, ash, PowerPoint and Excel), and PDF
documents.
 PaMTM (Protector add-in) corresponds to the Producer Tool combined with a producer-
side Packager. It is a plug-in for MS Oce that allows producers of oce documents to
specify who is allowed to see which document and when.
 RightsServerTM corresponds to the combination of the License Service (although no real
licenses are used), the Tracking Service and the Access Service. Every time consumers want
to perform actions on some protected content, they must contact the Content Service and
authenticate to the RightsServer. Consumers can only perform the action if the RightsServer
gives permission to the Content Service. The RightsServer keeps an audit trail of who
did what and when. The RightsServer allows changing the rights at all times. Using the
RightsServer, information can be changed or revoked at any time.
 LicenseMasterTM corresponds to the License Service. It is an alternative to the
RightsServer. When the LicenseMaster is used, super-distribution is possible. The Li-
censeMaster focuses on protecting applications. An application can be activated by using a
single-use 25-digit code.
3.7.5 SealedMedia
SealedMedia [37] oers an intra-company DRM system which supports 14 Windows-based content
formats: Microsoft Outlook, Lotus Notes, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft PowerPoint,
Adobe PDF, HTML, GIF, JPEG, PNG, MP3, Apple QuickTime, MPEG-1, and MPEG-4. Apple
supports the same formats except for Microsoft Outlook, Lotus Notes and Microsoft Oce.
SealedMedia oers three main components: the Sealer, the Unsealer and the License Server.
 The Sealer is run by the producer and corresponds to the Producer Tool and the Import
Service in our generic architecture. The Sealer communicates with the License Server to
allow rights distribution.
 The Unsealer corresponds to the DRM Client and operates transparently for the consumer:
it becomes only visible in exceptional circumstances, for instance when a license expires
when the consumer is oine. The Unsealer communicates with the License Server to obtain
licenses.
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Security requirement WMDRM FairPlay Adobe LWDRM EMMS OMA
Controlled distribution Broken Content is Broken Content is Yes? N/A
exportable exportable
Controlled consumption Broken Broken Broken No Yes? N/A
Fraud detection No ? No Yes No N/A
Permanent protection Broken Broken Broken ? Yes? N/A
Tight coupling Broken Broken Broken ? Yes? N/A
Renewability Yes No No ? ? N/A
Revocability Yes No No ? ? Yes
Tamper-resistant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A
usage rules
Table 1: Comparison of security requirements
 The License Server corresponds to the License Service and the Tracking Service in the
generic architecture. Licenses are issued and all consumer activity can be logged. A graphical
management console is oered allowing content publishers to control every aspect of the
License Service operation.
Because SealedMedia is intended for intra-company use, no Payment Service is needed. Content
is super-distributed, in practice the company network will be used for distribution of content. By
consequence, no integrated Content Service is needed. An external Access Service is possible.
The renewability and revocability requirements are fullled: the License Server can force con-
sumers to update their Unsealer before being able to consume content. SealedMedia uses its
own trusted clock. Rights can be revoked instantly. SealedMedia supports three authentication
mechanisms: its own user name and password authentication, NT authentication, and server-side
authentication. NT Authentication checks the user name that is currently using the operating
system. Server-side authentication uses an Access Service.
The producer denes who can access its content. Rights can be assigned to a single content
item or a content group. Both a start-time and an end-time can be set. Rights can be revoked
instantly. The maximum oine period for being able to consume content can be set. Some items
can be locked. It is possible to determine whether content can leave the (company) network. The
following actions can be set: print, annotate, copy-paste, save, seal, read-only access, edit. The
degree of editing freedom can also be set: consumers may have full editing freedom, may add
components or may only enter data. Changes can be tracked.
3.8 Summary
In this section, we have discussed the most important proprietary technologies and matched them
to the requirements outlined in Section 1.5. By way of wrap up, we summarize how each tech-
nology supports these requirements in two tables. The rst table shows an overview of security
requirements, while the second summarizes exibility requirements.
3.8.1 Security requirements
All the discussed technologies use the "security through obscurity" principle. When information
about the fulllment is found, it is often due to a successful attack. The dierent attacks are based
on the same principle: sending the unprotected content to a le instead of the output channel
(audio/video output, printer, display, . . . ). This attack breaks several requirements at once, as
can be seen in table 1. WMDRM is the only technology could be xed after a successful attack,
but recently it has been broken again.
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3.8.2 Flexibility requirements
Although most DRM technology providers do not disclose much information about their support
for exibility, we were able to deduce most of the implicit information and to check the requirements
dened in Section 1.5. Table 2 summarizes our study on exibility requirements.
4 Open Standards
We have seen in the previous part the most important proprietary DRM technologies. These
are generally closed source and oer limited interoperability. Some open standards are being
developed to overcome this problem. We rst discuss in Section 4.1 MPEG-21, which denes
an open multimedia framework for the distribution and consumption of content. In Section 4.2
We briey discuss Coral and its successor Marlin. Coral wants to oer interoperability between
dierent existing DRM technologies, while Marlin uses this to develop a standard specication
for content management and protection. In Section 4.3 and Section 4.1 we discuss two expressive
and extensible competing Rights Expression Languages: ODRL and MPEG-21 REL [56, 60]. The
former is adopted by OMA (Section 3.6), the latter by MPEG-21.
4.1 MPEG-21 framework
Both production and consumption of digital content is increasing at a rapid pace. Therefore,
the Moving Pictures Experts Group started in 2001 with the specication of MPEG-21, an open,
standardized multimedia framework. It enables the use of content across a wide range of networks
and devices. Production, publication and consumption of content using many dierent platforms
is taken into account. Of course, Digital Rights Management is an important property in the
framework and a standardized protection mechanism is needed. More information about this can
be found on [30] and a good introduction is available on [51].
MPEG-21 denes a framework using existing open standards, if present, and otherwise, it
develops new standards itself or engages other organizations or groups to do so. Dierent Calls
for Proposals where issued, resulting in the adoption of proposals as standards in MPEG-21.
MPEG-21 is supported by OMA (see Section 3.6), ITU [23] and the Open eBook Forum [33].
The two key concepts in MPEG-21 are the Digital Item and the User. The Digital Item is what
we called content, and is the basic entity of distribution and interaction. the User is the entity that
interacts with Digital Items. The goal of MPEG-21 can now be redened as "to access, consume,
trade and otherwise manipulate Digital Items in an ecient, transparent and interoperable way".
From a technical perspective, however, MPEG-21 makes no distinction between content producers
and content consumers: both are users.
Besides client-server, also peer-to-peer application are taken into account while dening the
framework.
MPEG-21 is organized and developed in several independent parts. A signicant number is
already nished:
Vision, Technologies and Strategy was the rst technical report and was approved in
September 2001. It describes the future multimedia framework and its architectural elements
together with the functional requirements for their specication.
Digital Item Declaration (DID [52]) species abstract terms and concepts enabling to de-
scribe the structure of interrelationships between Digital Items. The DID part contains three
sections: Model, Representation and Schema. Model describes the terms and concepts, Repre-
sentation contains a normative descriptions of the syntax and semantics of each DID element
in XML and Schema describes a normative XML schema comprising the grammar of the DID
representation in XML.
We now briey describe the most important concepts of the DID. Most of these are illustrated
in Figure 12. The smallest identiable, unambiguous locatable piece of content is called a resource.
A fragment of a resource designates a specic point or range within that resource. A descriptor
associates information with the enclosing element and is a component or a statement. A component
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Table 2: Comparison of exibility requirements
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Figure 12: Some DID elements and their relationships
is a binding of a resource to its relevant descriptors. A statement is a literal textual value that
contains information, for example descriptions, revision tracking, identifying information. An item
is a grouping of sub-items and/or components that are bound to relevant descriptors. An item
can contain choices, selections or can be conditional. A choice is a set of related selections. The
selections describe each possible decision and will aect certain conditions when activated. A
condition evaluates whether or not to enclose an optional element. Depending on the specic
selection, other parts of the Digital Item can be shown. It could for example contain an image
in dierent qualities and formats. A container is just a grouping of items and/or containers. An
anchor binds descriptors to a fragment. An annotation can be added to an element and contains
information about that element without changing it. An XML example is given in Figure 13.
.
Digital Item Identication (DII [52]) species unique identiers for (parts of) Digital Items,
related intellectual property or description schemes and how to to link Digital Items with related
information such as meta data. A unique identier for a Digital Item can be put as statement in
an associated descriptor and will have the form of a URI. Digital Item Types also have dierent
URIs, which are put in a statement of a Digital Item. Users may use dierent schemes to describe
their specic content. Therefore, the XML mechanism of name spaces is used. MPEG-21 does
not try to specify new identication schemes if good ones already exist.
Rights Expression Language (REL [46, 76]) denes a REL to use in MPEG-21. The
winner in the Call for Proposals for a Rights Data Dictionary and Rights Description Language
was XrML (eXtensible rights Markup Language [15]) (created by ContentGuard [5]). Its
successor is MPEG-21 REL [46] and is an open, XML-based REL which oers a high degree of
expressiveness, exibility, extensibility and interoperability. MPEG-21 is still competing with
ODRL.
Products from a range of companies have adopted MPEG-21 or XrML in their products. Some
of them are Microsoft, Sony and DMDsecure. Many companies, such as IMB, HP, Cisco and
Verisign participate in the MPEG-21 Rights Language Technical Committee ("RLTC") to create
standards based on XrML. Some industrial partners are Microsoft, Adobe Systems, DMDsecure
and Xerox Corp.
To describe the concepts and the interrelationships w.r.t. rights, XrML has developed a data
model that is also used by MPEG-21 REL. This is also the base of expressing rights with the help
of XML les.
A central entity in MPEG-21 REL is the Grant, which consists of four other central entities
and their relationships: Principal, Right, Resource and Condition. This is illustrated in Figure
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Figure 13: Example of a MPEG-21 container representation in XML
14.
A resource can be a digital work (i.e. content), a service (such as an e-mail service), or a simple
piece of information (such as a name or an e-mail address). The resource is also called the 'object'
of the grant.
A right is an action or a class of actions that can be performed on a resource. It can be seen
as the 'verb' of the grant. Some commonly used rights relating to other rights are issue, revoke
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Figure 14: MPEG-21 entity "Grant" Figure 15: MPEG-21 entity "License"
and obtain. Other rights are content-type specic. Examples are print and play rights.
The principal is the party to whom the rights are granted. The identication is done by
information unique to that principal. The Principal must be able to prove his identity using an
authentication mechanism. Both public/private key mechanism and credentials are supported.
Other identication technologies can still be added later. Each principal identies exactly one
party. A set of parties is thus not a principal. The principal is the 'subject' of the grant.
A condition species the terms, conditions and obligations under which the principal can
exercise the rights on the resource. A simple condition is a time interval determining when the
rights can be exercised. Other conditions are the existence of a watermark, destination and
renderer. A set of conditions can be put in conjunction, so that all conditions have to be met rst.
The nal central entity in XrML is the license and is illustrated in Figure 15. A license in
MPEG-21 REL is conceptually the issuance of grants by their issuing parties. This matches our
denition of a license given in Section 1.4. A license consist rst of all of a set of grants which give
some principals a set of rights to some resources under certain conditions. Secondly, the license
contains the identication of the issuers of the license. An issuer can digitally sign the license.
Syntactically, multiple issuers may sign it. Finally, some additional information can be added,
such as description or validity date. Notice the absence of an identication of the principal: this
is already done in the grants.
As an example, a minimal license is shown in Figure 16.
The structure and organization of MPEG-21 REL is shown in Figure 17. MPEG-21 has a
Core Schema at the basis. Here, basic concepts of MPEG-21 REL are dened. These include
license, grant, resource, principal, right and condition. The last four of these concepts are dened
in an abstract way and can be extended in the extensions of the core schema to become useful for
specic content formats. Some rights dened in the Core Schema are revoke and issue.
A Standard Extension Schema contains general and broadly applicable denitions of concepts
that are not at the heart of the MPEG-21 semantics. It supports the notion of external service
required to exercise a right (e.g. usage tracking), payment conditions and methods, and time
conditions.
The Content Schema denes rights management concepts specically related to digital works
such as movies and book, such as the right to lend, delete, copy, print, export or edit a digital
work. An example of a condition is the presence of a watermark.
Other parties may dene their own Extension Schemas.
The language semantics enables the authenticity of any semantically signicant construct using
open and standard cryptographic mechanisms such as digital signatures. The same is true for
condentiality, enabling encryption of any semantically signicant construct.
Pattern matching is provided and oers a way to specify a set of principals, rights, resources
and conditions.
Rights Data Dictionary (RDD [76]) is closely linked to the Rights Expression Language
part and denes the exact semantic in the REL. It denes a methodology to dene and catalogue
terms in the context of rights management. RDD forms the basis to express rights and permissions
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Figure 16: Example of a minimal MPEG-21 REL License in XML
as described in REL. The RDD standard oers a basis set of terms and oers a methodology to
make a dictionary. This basis set can be extended according to the needs of the specic content
or context, resulting in dierent schemes. RDD oers a mapping and transformation of terms
between dierent schemes, independent of the name of these terms.
Digital Item Adaptation (DIA [75]) species tools for the adaptation of Digital Items.
One of the targets of MPEG-21 is interoperable, transparent access to (distributed) advanced
multimedia content. Therefore, content may need to be adapted such that devices or networks
with specic capabilities are able to access or deliver it. This is specied in this part and
illustrated at high level in Figure 18. A Digital Item is converted to an adapted Digital Item by
a Resource Adaptation Engine, who adapts the DID, resource and the description. For being
able to convert content, it is necessary to specify the description of content format and usage
environments, which is part of the DIA specication.
.
Digital Item Processing (DIP): DID is a static declaration of only information related to the
item (structure, resources and meta data): no information is included about implied processing.
The user has thus nothing that indicates how the content should be processed (e.g. where to
download the Digital Item or the corresponding rights, presenting individual resources, . . . ).
This kind of information is specied by DIP. DIP denes mechanisms for standardized and
interoperable processing of information in the Digital Item.
Future work. The task of MPEG-21 has not yet been nished. Future work or work in
progress includes: denition of an interoperable framework for Intellectual Property Management
and Protection in a reliable way across networks and on devices, evaluation of methods for
persistent association technologies, denition of MPEG-21 reference software in general and test
bed for MPEG-21 resource delivery in general, denition of an MPEG-21 le format, exploration
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Figure 17: MPEG-21 REL structure and organization
Figure 18: Digital Item Adaptation architecture
of requirements and technology for highly scalable video and audio coding and nally, specication
of MPEG-21 event reporting mechanism which will allow for example tracking of content usage.
4.2 Coral Consortium and Marlin JDA
The Coral Consortium Corporation [6] is a cross industry consortium containing content providers,
service providers and consumer electronics manufacturers. Its goal is to establish interoperability
between dierent existing DRM technologies by developing and standardizing a set of specica-
tions. The resulting interoperability layer supports the coexistence of multiple dierent DRM
technologies and transparently oers a uniform experience to the users of it, not having to know
which DRM technology they are using. Both interoperability of secure distribution over the In-
ternet and home networks are supported. By using Coral gateways, existing devices will not get
obsolete. On 1 March 2005, the Coral Consortium v1.0 specications were released. Its found-
ing members are HP, InterTrust, Philips, Matsushita (Panasonic), Samsung, Sony and Twentieth
Century Fox. Now, the consortium counts nearly 30 members, under which the four major music
labels: EMI, Universal, Warner and Sony-BMG.
In January 2005, a subpart of the Coral Consortium members started with the Marlin Joint
Development Association (Marlin JDA) which builds upon the results of Coral. The goal of the
Marlin JDA is to provide standard specication for content management and protection for the
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Figure 19: ODRL founding model
consumers electronics industry. This specication will allow consumer electronics companies to
build DRM clients into their consumer devices. Popular distribution models, such as using the
Internet or broadcast, will be supported. Convergence across consumer Internet, broadcast and
mobile devices and services will be facilitated. The Marlin v1.0 specication is expected in the
summer of 2005 and will be completely compatible with the CORAL specications. Another goal
of MARLIN is an enhanced user friendliness. The founding members are Sony, Samsung, Royal
Philips Electronics, Panasonic, and InterTrust.
4.3 ODRL
ODRL (Open Digital Rights Language) [32] is an open, XML-based REL that oers a high degree
of expressiveness, exibility, extensibility and interoperability. ODRL oers a core set of semantics.
Additional semantics can be layered on top of ODRL. ODRL was proposed by IPR Systems [25].
The last version (V.1.1) was announced in September 19, 2002. Some of the ODRL supporters are
OMA (see Section 3.6), the W3C [44], AegisDRM (see Section 3.7.4), and Nokia [31]. A point of
focus in ODRL is the reuse of of digital material both on the Internet as in physical media. Content
can be reused, combined and extended at the innitum, while rights are honored. Founding model
The founding model describes at a conceptual level how rights specication is seen by ODRL.
ODRL is build upon this viewpoint, and thus also the XML denitions. As illustrated in Figure
19, the three basis entities in the ODRL foundation model are 'assets', 'rights' and 'party'.
Assets are content, physical or digital, on which rights can be applied. These must have
a unique identication. An asset can consist of many dierent subparts (also assets) and can
exist in dierent formats. Parties can be both content consumers and content producers (Rights
Holders) and can be humans, organizations or roles. Right Holders are usually parties that have
played some role in the creation, production or distribution of the asset and can assert some form
of ownership over the asset and/or its Permissions and correspond to our notion of producers.
Rights Holders can also receive royalties.
A general description of Assets and Parties is outside the scope of ODRL. ODRL did how-
ever determine that these must be referenced by a URI. If the subparts of Assets are uniquely
identiable, then rights can be applied on these subparts.
Rights on Assets can be given to Parties. Rights include Permissions, which are actions that
can be performed on assets (play, print, . . . ). These Permissions can contain Constraints, Re-
quirements and Conditions. Constraints are limitations on the Permissions (e.g. play maximum 5
times). Requirements are the preconditions that must be fullled before exercising the Permission.
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Figure 20: ODRL foundation model expressed in XML
(e.g. pay $ 5 for being able to play the video). Conditions specify exceptions; if one becomes true,
it expires the Permissions (e.g. subscription to the DRM service expires). Re-negotiations may
be needed.
With these three entities, Oers and Agreements can be specied. An Oer is a proposal from
the Rights Holder to the consumer (other Party). An oer can be converted in an Agreement,
which is a specic concretisation of an Oer. ODRL can also express the revocation of Oers and
Agreements.
A Context can be linked with any entity and can describe extra information about that entity
or relationships between dierent entities. The Context can be used for dierent purposes. When
it is linked with a Parties entity, it may contain the name, the role or a unique identier of that
entity. An Agreement can have the time and location of the transaction as its context. A rights
entity can have a context with a unique identier for that rights expression.
ODRL can also describe how the content (Assets) is cryptographically manipulated. This is
made possible by the Digital Signature and Encryption Digest/Key items.
An example of an XML representation based on the ODRL foundation model can be seen in
Figure 20.
5 Highlights
Systems that provide DRM are highly complex and extensive [71]: DRM technologies must support
a diversity of devices, users, platforms, and media, and a wide variety of system requirements
concerning security, exibility, and manageability. This complexity and extensiveness poses three
major challenges to DRM development: fragmentation of individual solutions, limited reuse and
interoperability between DRM systems, and lack of a domain-specic structure that supports and
guides the design and implementation of DRM systems and their applications.
The rst challenge relates to the fact that state-of-the-art DRM technologies are often ad-
hoc, which leads to fragmented solutions and makes it very dicult to complete the global DRM
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picture. A complete DRM solution should provide a single platform that can support every aspect
of digital rights management [64].
The second challenge, limited interoperability, is partly caused by in-house developed solutions
that are incompatible with similar systems produced by other parties. Although various research
groups have produced \vertically integrated" designs in which their particular set of components
are specically conceived to collaborate, their solutions are unable to interoperate with components
from other groups. Given the complexity and extensiveness of DRM, interoperability between
specic DRM technologies is crucial to integrate existing solutions [64].
The third challenge, lack of guiding software structure, is typical for complex software systems
in evolution, and providing such a context is often a sign of growing maturity of the application
domain [68]. In order to evolve towards a complete set of interoperable DRM solutions, we need a
well-dened software architecture that identies the major services and denes how they interact
[64, 49].
The challenges of integrating independent system components are well-recognized and are being
addressed in other application domains than DRM, such as network protocol stacks, web services,
or graphical user interfaces [74]. The Internet architecture, for instance, convincingly demonstrates
how a properly chosen set of guiding principles can shape the evolution of a complex system across
vast changes in technology, scale, and usage [55]. The power of the Internet lies not so much in
the elegance or eciency of its individual components, but in the overall ability to encompass
tremendous growth in scale and diversity as usage and technology continue to evolve.
This report has proposed a rst step towards a DRM software architecture that supports DRM
developers in producing complete and interoperable systems. The architecture is approached both
from a functional and a security perspective. The proposed architecture is validated by matching
it to state-of-the-art DRM technologies.
A next step towards a software architecture for DRM has been presented in [70]. In this paper,
a layered architectural style has been proposed. In this case, the functional perspective zooms in on
the top layers, closest to the applications using the architecture. The security perspective focuses
on the bottom layers, which oer cryptographic primitives to enforce digital rights. In other words,
the cryptographic primitives at the bottom layers lay the foundation for the upper layers to build
upon. The paper studies whether or not the main DRM services (i.e. content, license, access,
tracking, payment, import, and identication) are supported by state-of-the-art DRM solutions.
It shows that some services are provided almost uniformly by all technologies, while others are
only oered sporadically. The Content and License Services are almost always implemented,
which seems nothing but normal for such key services. Services for accessing, tracking, paying and
importing are provided in approximately 50% of the cases, while the Identication Service is not
implemented by any of the studied DRM techniques, at least not to our knowledge.
When relating these results with the three main DRM challenges (completeness, interoperabil-
ity, and software architecture support), we can draw the following conclusions. First of all, the
fact that so many dierent DRM technologies implement the same or similar services conrms our
claim that we need an architecture that promotes reuse and interoperation of individual service
components.
Secondly, the services with the highest benet from reuse and interoperation are the Content
and License Service. All DRM technologies that need these services would benet from a reusable
implementation.
Thirdly, since dierent DRM technologies implement dierent sets of services, trying to stan-
dardize 'the' DRM technology seems less ecient than focusing on particular services these tech-
nologies are composed of. This brings us back to the analogy with the Internet architecture, which
clearly identies service responsibilities and a common platform that can support a wide variety
of networking services. The key message is that this architecture proves that a complete solution
can be oered by a single platform if it allows reusable services to be plugged in, without trying
to provide a single overall standard implementation. Until today, many dierent companies and
organizations extend the TCP/IP architecture with protocols for quality-of-service, wireless com-
munication, routing, media streaming, or security. If we are to provide complete DRM solutions,
following the Internet approach seems to be a good idea.
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6 Conclusion
Starting from the identication of major DRM components, this report has proposed a rst step
towards a generic DRM architecture and subsequently mapped six DRM systems onto it, thereby
enabling a critical evaluation. The underlying model consists of a distributed view and perspectives
from consumer, producer, as well as the publisher. This model has proven to be a useful framework
to inventory, analyze, and discuss research in this eld, and to set the agenda for the future.
Inspection of this framework shows the use of Content and License Services to be well represented
in the DRM technologies described. The uniform application of services like access, import,
tracking, and payment services is less developed, whereas identication is absent. Special attention
should go to three main DRM challenges: completeness, interoperability, and software architecture
support. Therefore, if DRM is not to end as the umpteenth ash in the data protection pan, it
may be high time to put software architecture design at the top of its research agenda.
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